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INTRODUCTION

rbitration is widely regarded by the legal community as a useful
method of alternative dispute resolution. Agreements to arbitrate future disputes are enforceable under federal and state law.
The federal courts have repeatedly declared that Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (the "FAA"),1 which requires that agreements to arbi* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The research and editorial assistance of
Emil Bukhman, Ruth Kalbitzer, Laura Proctor, and Louis Silvestri is gratefully acknowledged. I also wish to thank Brooklyn Law School and Dean Joan Wexler for a summer
stipend to research and write this Article; and my daughter, Susan Poser, Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Nebraska Law School, for many helpful editorial suggestions
on the manuscript of this Article. A portion of the material in this Article appeared, in a
somewhat different form, in Time Bars in SecuritiesArbitrations,29 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 185 (1996).

1. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration
an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
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trate be enforced to the same extent as other contracts, reflects a strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration.2 The Supreme Court has stated that
where a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of
arbitrability: "[A]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not

be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted

dispute.

Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." '3 Where an

arbitration agreement is ambiguous, the FAA's policy favoring arbitration requires that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
'4
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."
In the 1987 case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,5 the

Supreme Court, reversing a policy established four decades earlier, held
that agreements to arbitrate future claims that might arise under the federal securities laws were enforceable. 6 Today, most brokerage firms require their customers to sign standard-form printed agreements

containing arbitration clauses as a condition of opening an account, and
most customer-broker disputes are subject to arbitration agreements.
If arbitration is to accomplish its paramount goal of relieving court congestion and enabling disputes to be resolved speedily and economically, it

must be separate and largely independent from the judicial system. 7 The
standard justification for the existence and usefulness of arbitration as an

alternative system of dispute resolution is that it is a quicker and cheaper
method of resolving disputes than litigation. Courts have adopted this
view; they claim that they usually defer to decisions by arbitrators. 8 Nev-

2. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) ("Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.").
3. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650
(1986) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960)).
4. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
5. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
6. Id. at 237-38.
7. Courts often state that arbitration is an independent system of dispute resolution.
See, e.g., Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 4, 7 (Ct. App.
1994).
8. In fact, some commentators have criticized judicial deference to arbitrators on the
ground that it makes the arbitrators nonaccountable to anyone. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin
& Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A JurisprudentialPerspective on Labor and
Employment Arbitrationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187,
1232-33 (1993).
It has also been pointed out that the securities arbitration process "has incorporated too
many characteristics of civil litigation, thereby undermining what many commentators believe are the essential advantages of arbitration-speed and low cost." SECURITIES ARBITRATION REFORM, REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BD. OF

GOVERNORS OF THE NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC. 7 (Jan. 1996) (David S. Ruder,

Chairman) [hereinafter RUDER REPORT]. See also Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses
Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 110507 (1993). Litigation-like procedures, such as clearer procedures for obtaining prehearing
discovery, have been established in order to introduce a greater degree of fairness into the
arbitration process. The author wrote three years ago (and still believes): "What is emerg-
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ertheless, too often they have been willing to decide issues that are more
properly left to the arbitrators.
One would expect that the widespread use of arbitration as an alternative method for the resolution of disputes between investors and their
brokers would have reduced the amount of court litigation in this area.
Customer-broker disputes have not, however, been moved out of the
courts. On the contrary, there has been a proliferation of litigation in the
federal courts in securities cases, much of it having little to do with the
underlying dispute. Investors often have to fight costly and time-consuming legal battles in court before their claims can be heard by arbitrators,
or they have to litigate in order to get their awards confirmed. The fact
that parties who signed an agreement to arbitrate future disputes find
themselves forced to litigate collateral issues tends to defeat the unique
advantages of arbitration.
The existence of extensive arbitration-related litigation thus raises the
question whether arbitration can realistically be regarded as a method of
alternative dispute resolution. Collateral litigation in securities cases has
in fact made arbitration not an alternative form of dispute resolution to
which parties may turn, but an additional form which they often do not
reach until they have engaged in extensive litigation. If arbitration is to
enable parties to resolve their differences with speed, economy, informality, privacy, and finality, then the ability of arbitrating parties to also resort to the courts must be reduced to a minimum.
The underlying issue is the question of what is meant by the term arbitrability. Under the FAA, the question of whether a dispute is arbitrable
is presumptively for the court, not the arbitrators, to decide. 9 Thus, if a
party contends that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement,
the statute gives the party the right to petition the court to determine
whether the parties executed a valid arbitration agreement and whether
the dispute falls within the scope of that agreement. If the court answers
both questions affirmatively, it must order the parties to arbitrate the dispute. At that point, the court's role is at an end. Once the dispute is
submitted to the arbitrators, they and not the court have the authority to
decide all procedural and substantive issues, subject only to the very limited judicial review that the court may exercise after the arbitrators have
handed down their award. 10
Thus, where parties have signed an arbitration agreement, whether or
not a particular issue may be submitted to a court for decision often depends on whether that issue is characterized as an issue of arbitrability, to
be decided by the court, or a procedural or substantive issue that is part
of the dispute, to be decided by the arbitrators. In this Article, I will
ing is a new compromise between the competing social goals of investor protection and the
efficiency, privacy, and finality of arbitration." Id. at 1111.
9. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1922-24 (1995).
10. The FAA permits the trial court to vacate an arbitration award if, inter alia, the
arbitrators have "exceeded their powers." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). This ground for judicial
review also raises a question of arbitrability. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
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argue that a narrow definition of arbitrability will best accomplish the

goals of arbitration, by limiting the role of the courts so that the primary
goal of arbitration-resolving disputes with the maximum degree of
speed and economy-can be accomplished.
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION

There are two principal types of forums for securities arbitration: the
self-regulatory organizations (SROs)" and the American Arbitration As-

sociation (AAA). 12 The SROs that have arbitration facilities are the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), seven stock
14
exchanges, 13 and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).
The NASD, of which virtually all brokerage firms are required to be
members,' 5 handles the vast majority of SRO arbitration cases (5419
cases were filed with it in 1993); while the New York Stock Exchange
in 1993) is a distant runner-up; and
(NYSE) (where 809 cases were filed
6
the other SROs are far behind.'

SRO arbitration has a long history. The NYSE 17 has provided facilities
for arbitrating disputes between its members at least since 1845.18 In the
early days, arbitration was conducted on an ad hoc basis:
When a dispute arose between two members, the parties could request a committee to hear the facts and adjudicate the case. Generally, the cases involved disputes over deliveries or some
disagreement regarding a specific transaction. In some instances,
11. In many but not all respects, the arbitration rules and procedures of the SROs
closely follow the Uniform Code of Arbitration (UCA), developed by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA). The UCA was adopted by the principal SROs in
1980 and has been amended several times since then. Constantine N. Katsoris, The Level
Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 429 (1989).
12. Parties may agree to submit existing or future disputes to arbitration either by
named arbitrators or by arbitrators appointed by a method set forth in the agreement.
Such private arbitration clauses are rarely used in agreements between brokerage firms
and their customers or employees. As early as 1935, the Securities and Exchange Commission took the position that the New York Stock Exchange should encourage its members to
offer customers a standard arbitration agreement. Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, SecuritiesArbitration at Self-Regulatory Organizations: New York Stock Exchange,
Inc., and NationalAssociation of SecuritiesDealers,Inc.-Administrationand Procedure,in
SECURITIES ARBITRATION

1994, at 47, 51 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook

Series No. 851, 1994) [hereinafter Masucci & Clemente].
13. These are the American Stock Exchange (Amex), Boston Stock Exchange (BSE),
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), Chicago (formerly Midwest) Stock Exchange
(CSE), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Pacific Stock Exchange (PSE), and Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PhSE).
14. The MSRB is an SRO established by the SEC pursuant to § 15B(b)(1) of the 1934
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1).
15. Section 15(b)(8) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8).
16. In 1993, the NASD accounted for 82.6% of all securities arbitrations filed. Fortyeight cases were filed with the Amex, none with the BSE, 15 with the CBOE, one with the
CSE, 30 with the MSRB, 199 with the PSE, and 40 with the PhSE. SECURITIES INDUSTRY
CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, REPORT

No. 8 25-29 (1994).

17. From 1817 to 1863, the NYSE was called the New York Stock & Exchange Board.
18. See generally New York Stock Exchange Archives (1817-present) [hereinafter
NYSE Archives].
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the committee had power to make a judgment and to award

damages. 19
The NYSE Constitution of 1869 not only provided for arbitration of "all
claims and matters of difference" between members but also gave nonmembers the right to arbitrate disputes with members if they agreed to

abide by the rules of the Exchange. These rules provided that all decisions of the NYSE Arbitration Committee were final, except for appeals

to the Exchange's Governing Committee. 20 In 1925, five years after New
York enacted the nation's first arbitration legislation, 21 the NYSE Arbitration Committee adopted a simple set of arbitration rules, including a

requirement that nonmember claimants sign a standardized submission
agreement, which included the rules governing the preparation and filing
of pleadings and the conduct of hearings. 22 Beginning about 1936, parties
23
in NYSE arbitrations began to be represented by counsel.
The NASD first offered arbitration facilities to the public in 1968, on a
voluntary basis only. Disputes could be arbitrated only if all parties
agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose. In 1972, arbitration became
mandatory for NASD members: Public customers could require brokers
who were NASD members to arbitrate securities controversies by virtue
of the NASD's arbitration rules.24 Thus, the rules of the two principal
19. 1 Arbitration Committees 1845-1869, Inventory of Records of the New York Stock
& Exchange Board 7 (on file with the NYSE Archives). An early NYSE arbitration involved a dispute about a contract for the sale of one hundred shares of New York & Erie
Railroad Company stock. The buyer refused to pay, claiming that the stock that the seller
offered to deliver was a different class of stock than he had contracted to buy. Rawdon v.
Winthrop (Nov. 5, 1845) (on file with the NYSE Archives). Another arbitration involved a
claim by a seller against his broker that the broker had not executed the sales at the best
possible prices. S. Jaudon & Co. v. Edwards (May 15, 1847) (on file with the NYSE
Archives). It appears likely that the latter arbitration was between a nonmember and a
member.
20. The Arbitration Committee, consisting of nine members, was charged with the
duty to investigate and decide all claims and matters of difference arising between members of the Exchange and to adjudicate such claims against members by nonmembers,
when such nonmembers agreed to abide by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
The decision of this Committee was final in all cases, except (1) where a member of the
Committee referred the case to the Governing Committee of the Exchange; and (2) in
cases involving a sum of $2500 or over, when either party could appeal, within ten days, to
the Governing Committee for final adjudication.
The Chairman of the Arbitration Committee was authorized to receive a fee of $15 in
each case, to be paid by the losing party. NYSE CONST., art. III, § 7 (1869) (on file with
the NYSE Archives).
21. Chapter 72 of the Consolidated Laws of New York became law on April 19, 1920.
New York Arbitration Law is now Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.Y.
CIV. PRAC. L & R art. 75 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1996).
22. Minutes of the NYSE Arbitration Committee (Dec. 8, 1925) (on file with the
NYSE Archives).
23. See, e.g., Tameling v. Carter, Minutes of the NYSE Arbitration Committee (Feb.
20, 1935) (on file with the NYSE Archives) (nonmembers of the NYSE who were represented by counsel unsuccessfully tried to persuade the Arbitration Committee to hear their
case); Minutes of NYSE Arbitration Committee (Mar. 10, 1936) (two NYSE member firms
were permitted to be represented by counsel at hearings of their controversy before the
Committee).
24. Letter from Susie Dippel, NASD Arbitration/Mediation Department, to the author (June 3, 1996) (on file with author).
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SROs required their members to arbitrate disputes with customers, but
customers had the option, at the time the dispute arose, of arbitrating or
litigating in court.

Brokerage firms used written agreements in order to require their customers to arbitrate future disputes arising out of their relationship. In
1953, however, the Supreme Court held in Wilko v. Swan2 5 that agreements to arbitrate future disputes under the federal securities laws were
unenforceable. 2 6 In Wilko, the Court was called upon to decide whether
an agreement between a brokerage firm and its customer to arbitrate any

future disputes barred the customer from suing under Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") 27 which gives the buyer of a security a right of rescission against a seller who sold securities through a

misstatement or omission of a material fact.2 8 The Court decided that

Section 14, the 1933 Act's nonwaiver provision, invalidated the arbitration agreement.2 9 It held that one of the rights that an investor could not
30
waive was the right to have a claim heard in federal court.
Wilko thus carved out an exception to the requirement of the FAA that

agreements to arbitrate be enforced on the same basis as other con-

tracts. 31 In Wilko, the Court resolved a conflict between two desirable
social policies: (1) the speed and economy of arbitration; and (2) the protection of the rights of investors against persons with superior bargaining
power.32 The Court decided the issue in favor of protecting investors. 33
For more than thirty years after Wilko, the lower federal courts routinely assumed that the decision applied not only to claims under the 1933
Act but equally to claims under the 1934 Act, which contains a nonwaiver
25. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
26. Id. at 438.

27. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1994).
28. For a description of Section 12(2), see NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW
AND REGULATION: PRrVATE RIGHTs OF ACrION 231-34 (1995).

29. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35. Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or

provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."

15 U.S.C. § 77n.
30. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
31. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
32. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
33. Id.

The Court found that '(t)wo policies, not easily reconcilable, are involved in
[Wilko].' On the one hand, the Arbitration Act stressed 'the need for avoid-

ing the delay and expense of litigation,' and directed that such agreements be
'valid, irrevocable, and enforceable' in federal courts. On the other hand,
the Securities Act of 1933 was '(d)esigned to protect investors' and to require
'issuers, underwriters, and dealers to make full and fair disclosure of the
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to prevent
fraud in their sale,' by creating 'a special right to recover for

misrepresentation. .. '
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431)
(citations omitted).
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provision similar to Section 14 of the 1933 Act.34 The 1934 Act regulates
the market for the trading of securities. Most federal securities claims by
customers against brokerage firms or their employees are brought under
the 1934 Act and, particularly, under Section 10(b) 35 of the Act and Rule
10b-536 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which prohibit any person from acting fraudulently in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 37 Although the 1934 Act does not expressly authorize a private right of action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, the
federal courts consistently have held that there is an implied right of action, and the Supreme Court has endorsed this view.3 8 Thus, a customer
retains the right to bring his federal securities claims against a brokerage
signed an agreement
firm in federal court if he so wishes, even if he has
39
with the firm that contains an arbitration clause.
Even though Wilko had held that agreements to arbitrate federal securities disputes were unenforceable, many brokerage firms continued to include in their standard customer agreements arbitration clauses that were
not restricted to arbitrable state-law claims. Concerned that the use of
such broad arbitration clauses might mislead investors into believing that
they had waived their rights to a judicial forum, the SEC in 1983 adopted
Rule 15c2-2, which made it a fraud for a broker-dealer to enter into an
agreement with a customer that "purports to bind the customer to the
arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the federal securities laws. ....,,40 Although the SEC rescinded rule 15c2-2 in 1987,
after the Supreme Court held that such disputes were arbitrable, 41 some
arbitration clauses that firms had amended in order to comply with the
rule continued to exclude federal securities claims even after McMahon.
Whether the exception clause continued to be effective depended on its
language. 42 A firm which had, in compliance with Rule 15c2-2, inserted
an exception clause into the arbitration clause of its standard-form cus34. Section 29(a) of the 1934 Act provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a).
35. Id. § 78j(b).
36. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1996).
37. For a discussion of Rule 10b-5 and its applicability to broker-dealers, see POSER,
supra note 28, at 219-360.
38. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983); POSER,
supra note 28, at 234-38.
39. Under the rules of the NYSE and other stock exchanges, customers could elect to
arbitrate such disputes. See supra text accompanying note 24.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a). See Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman, Selected Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress, Unconscionability,
Waiver, Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1547, 1553-63 (1991).
41. Rescission of Rule Governing Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses in BrokerDealer Customer Agreements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-25034, 52 [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,163, at 88,886 (Oct. 15, 1987).
42. See cases discussed in Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of
SecuritiesArbitration,in SECURrrIES ARBITRATION 1994, at 135 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 852, 1994).
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tomer's agreement for "any claim ...under the federal securities laws"
discovered that under the plain language of the agreement such claims
were not arbitrable even after McMahon.43 On the other hand, an exception in an arbitration clause for claims under the federal securities laws
"to the extent [that they] may be litigated" no longer excluded federal
44
securities claims from arbitration once McMahon had been decided.
Meanwhile, the first crack in the Wilko doctrine had come in 1974, in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 45 Scherk involved the purchase by an
American corporation of three interrelated European business entities
from a German citizen living in Switzerland. The purchase agreement
was negotiated in the United States and Europe and signed in Austria.
The closing was held in Switzerland. The agreement specified that any
disputes were to be arbitrated in Paris and that Illinois law should govern
the interpretation and performance of the agreement. 46 A year after the
deal closed, the purchaser brought an action against the seller under Sec47
tion 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the arbitration clause, distinguishing the case from Wilko on the ground that it involved an international agreement, which implicated policies significantly different from
those found controlling in Wilko. 48 In particular, the Court noted that
international conflict-of-laws problems might arise, and that in the absence of the arbitration agreement considerable uncertainty existed as to
the law applicable to the contract. 49 Although the Court noted that the
dispute arose under the 1934 Act, not the 1933 Act, it neither rested its
decision on that distinction, nor did it expressly distinguish Wilko on the
ground that Scherk involved a commercial agreement between two businesses, whereas Wilko involved an agreement between a broker and one
of its customers.
Despite Scherk, the federal courts, following the Supreme Court's mandate in Wilko, continued to strike down arbitration agreements governing
customers' claims under the federal securities laws. 50 As late as 1983,
Professor Loss, the leading authority on securities regulation, wrote that
"the Wilko holding applied fully to implied actions." 5 1 Nevertheless,
Scherk cast a long shadow into the future; it demonstrated a new predis43. See, e.g., Torrence v. Murphy, 815 F. Supp. 965, 974 (S.D. Miss. 1993); see also
Kayne v. PaineWebber, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
44. See, e.g., Clark v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 924 F.2d 550, 556
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 818 (1991).
45. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
46. Id. at 508.
47. Id. at 509. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 apply to the sale of an entire business, if
the sale is effected by means of a transfer of securities. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
48. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515.
49. Id. at 515-17.
50. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 248 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

51. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS

OF SECURITIES REGULATION

1195 (1983).
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position of the Court to uphold the validity of arbitration agreements involving the securities laws.
In 1985, the Supreme Court took another important step toward dis-

mantling the Wilko doctrine. In Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,5 2 the
Court held that where a brokerage-firm customer has asserted both non-

arbitrable federal claims and arbitrable state-law claims involving the
same facts and legal issues, the state-law claims must be arbitrated, even
though this would require two separate proceedings. 5 3 The Court reasoned that the primary goal of the FAA was to enforce private agreements to arbitrate and that this goal should be given precedence over the

54
secondary goal of encouraging efficient and speedy dispute resolution.
In a concurring opinion that was widely noted at the time, Justice White

observed that although the question of whether the Wilko doctrine ap-

plied to 1934 Act claims was not before the Court, there was "substantial

doubt" on this question. 55 A few months later, the Court in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 56 cast additional doubt on

the continued viability of the Wilko doctrine by upholding the validity of
an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under another federal regula57
tory statute, the Sherman Act.
In 1987 in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,58 the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, finally held that all claims brought
under the 1934 Act were arbitrable.5 9 According to the majority opinion,
the Wilko Court had merely stated that the arbitration procedures that
existed in 1953 were inadequate to enforce investors' rights under the

securities laws. 60 Since the time of the Wilko decision, however, Congress had given the SEC additional powers to review the arbitration procedures of the self-regulatory organizations, and these procedures now
gave investors adequate protection. 61 The SEC, which had previously
52. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
53. Id. at 224.
54. Id. at 221.
55. Id. at 224. After the Byrd decision, the First and Eighth Circuits held that Wilko
did not extend to 1934 Act claims; while the Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits held that such claims were not subject to compulsory arbitration. In response to
the conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court agreed to review the decision of the
Second Circuit in McMahon denying arbitration. See Norman S. Poser, Arbitrability of
InternationalSecurities Disputes, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 675, 679 (1986).
56. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
57. Id. at 640.
58. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
59. The Court also held, by a unanimous vote, that predispute agreements to arbitrate
claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961 et seq., were enforceable. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242.
60. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
61. In 1975, Congress amended § 19 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), to give the
SEC new oversight powers over the SROs. Under the amended statute:
No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act, and the
Commission has the power, on its own initiative, to "abrogate, add to, and
delete from" any SRO rule if it finds such changes necessary or appropriate
to further the objectives of the Act. In short, the Commission has broad
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supported the Wilko doctrine of nonarbitrability, 62 appeared before the
Court as an amicus in McMahon in support of the brokerage firm's position in favor of arbitrability. The Commission's policy shift may well
have had a strong, if not decisive, influence on the Court's decision.
As to the nonwaiver provision of the 1934 Act, the McMahon Court
found that it prohibited the waiver only of substantive provisions of the
Act, but not of the jurisdictional section, which "does not impose any
statutory duties."'63 The Court found it "difficult to reconcile Wilko's mis-

trust of the arbitral process with this Court's subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act."'64
Because the McMahon decision involved the 1934 Act and not the 1933

Act, it did not technically overrule Wilko, but, in the words of Professor
Jeffrey Stempel, after McMahon the Wilko doctrine was "the judicial
equivalent of a wounded animal limping across the savannah, sure to be
attacked. '65 The lower courts applied McMahon retroactively, so that

arbitration very quickly became the normal method of resolving customer-broker disputes. Between 1985 and 1993, the total number of arbi-

trations (including arbitrations between SRO members and between
members and their employees) commenced before panels sponsored by
66
the SROs more than doubled, increasing from 2796 to 6561 arbitrations.
67
In 1995, 6058 arbitrations were filed with the NASD alone.
Two years after McMahon, the Supreme Court finally put the wounded
animal out of its misery. In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,68 the Court concluded that since no relevant distinction existed between the 1933 and 1934 Acts, agreements to arbitrate 1933 Act
disputes also were valid. 69 The Court stated:
authority to oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating
to customer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any
rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately
protect statutory rights.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the SEC "neither
polices nor monitors the results of [SRO] arbitrations for possible misapplications of securities laws or for indications of how investors fare in these proceedings." Id. at 265.
62. As noted earlier, in 1983 the SEC had adopted Rule 15c2-2, which prohibited the
practice by brokerage firms of including arbitration clauses covering federal claims in their
customer agreements. See supra note 40.
63. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228.
64. Id. at 231-32.
65. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of ArbitrationAgreements,
22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 294 (1990).

66. See Masucci & Clemente, supra note 12, at 53.
67. Letter from Susie Dippel, NASD Arbitration/Mediation Department, to the author (June 3, 1996) (on file with the author).
68. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
69. The Court noted the distinction that the 1933 Act allows concurrent jurisdiction in
the federal and state courts, whereas the 1934 Act has exclusive federal jurisdiction; but it
stated that this distinction suggests that arbitration agreements, which are "in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause," should not be prohibited under the 1933 Act,
"since they, like the provision for concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of
allowing buyers of securities a broader right to select the forum for resolving disputes,
whether it be judicial or otherwise." Id. at 483.
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"By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." To the extent
that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong
of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving
endorsement
70
disputes.
Thus, after thirty-six years, the Supreme Court finally buried the Wilko
doctrine. In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court also held that retroactive
application of its ruling was appropriate under the test it had formulated
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,71 despite the fact that its decision to overrule Wilko "establishes a new principle of law for arbitration agreements
under the Securities Act."'7 2 The Court justified retroactive application
on the ground that the decision did not produce "substantial inequitable
results," because the plaintiffs did not make any serious allegation 73that
they relied on Wilko when they agreed to arbitrate future disputes.
III.

WHY ARBITRATION-RELATED LITIGATION OCCURS

Although many cases that would have been tried in court before the
McMahon decision are now heard by arbitrators, mandatory securities
arbitration has, paradoxically, generated a large volume of litigation, a
development that tends to defeat the primary goals of arbitration: its
ability to reduce the costs and delays of court litigation. Instead of being
an independent alternative to litigation, securities arbitration too often
turns out to be just one part of a bifurcated proceeding, which includes
both arbitration and litigation. Investors who are willing to submit their
claims against their brokers to arbitration, in compliance with the agreement that they signed when they opened their accounts, find that they are
required to litigate issues relating to the arbitration before their claims
can be heard.
Although brokerage firms led the eventually successful battle for
mandatory arbitration, it is the thesis of this Article that many firms fundamentally distrust the arbitral process, and that this distrust has led
them to use litigation as a way of limiting arbitrators' authority. In order
to understand why this is so, it is necessary to review briefly the differences between the procedures used in a judicial and an arbitral forum.
The securities arbitration rules of the SROs and AAA outline the procedures governing securities arbitrations. 74 These procedures parallel
70. Id. at 481 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (citation omitted).
71. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
72. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 485.

73. Id.
74. See NASD
7501-7632 (1996);
RULES

(1993).

CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, reprinted in NASD MANUAL at
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION
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those of court litigation in several respects. Parties have the right to be
represented by counsel; their pleadings define the issues to be resolved
and provide notice of opposing parties' principal contentions; there is an
opportunity for prehearing discovery; at the hearing, the parties introduce oral and written evidence, cross-examine opposing witnesses, and
argue their positions before the arbitrators; and, finally, the arbitrators
deliberate and issue their decision, which is usually referred to as an
"award." There are, however, important differences between arbitration
and litigation.
There is little motion practice in securities arbitrations. Most arbitration claims that are not settled go to a hearing. Thus, claims that a trial
judge might dismiss before trial for failure to state a claim or on a motion
for summary judgment are much more likely to be heard by arbitrators.
Arbitrators are not subject to the kinds of restraints that a trial judge
exercises over a jury. There is no judge to instruct the arbitrators on the
law. After the arbitration hearing, there are no established procedures
for the losing party to obtain a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a
remittitur on the question of damages.
Arbitration procedures are informal and arbitrators are not required to
follow the rules of evidence. For example, prejudicial or nonprobative
evidence is often admitted at the hearing "for what it is worth. ' 75
Arbitrations are secret, and arbitrators seldom write reasoned opinions
supporting their awards. Furthermore, awards do not have precedential
effect. 76 The results of arbitrations are therefore far more unpredictable
than those of litigation.
Under the FAA, judicial review of arbitral awards is limited to situations where the arbitrators can be shown to be corrupt, biased, or lacking
authority. 77 An arbitrator's decision will not be vacated by a court on the
ground that it is based on a mistake of fact or law.78 Arbitrators are not
75. Richard S. Bayer & Harlan S. Abrahams, The Trouble with Arbitration, 11 No. 2
LITIGATION

30 (1985).

76. Under the prevailing judicial view, an agreement to arbitrate represents a decision
to opt out of the public legal system and into a private system that places primary value on
dispute resolution. According to this view, the only law that results is the award itself and
that law is binding only on the immediate parties. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 8, at
1226.
77. 9 U.S.C. § 10.
78. Several circuit courts will vacate an arbitral award if the arbitrators demonstrate
"manifest disregard for the law." This judicially created ground for review has been construed narrowly. It clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the
law.
The error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no
attention to it. To adopt a less strict standard of judicial review would be to
undermine our well established deference to arbitration as a favored method
of settling disputes when agreed to by the parties. Judicial inquiry under the
"manifest disregard" standard is therefore extremely limited. The governing
law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well defined,
explicit, and clearly applicable. We are not at liberty to set aside an arbitra-
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required to follow-or even to know-the law and, unlike trial judges
and juries, are virtually unaccountable to any judicial or other supervisory
79
entity.
Thus, in some respects, arbitration resembles the judicial system; in
others, it differs. In theory, securities arbitration provides an alternative
forum for litigants, which is supposed to offer the advantages of speed,
economy, privacy, informality, and finality that the judicial system cannot
provide.8 0 Arbitration is also meant to reduce court congestion, offering
relief from the "rampant growth of the civil docket in the United States"
which has been described as an example of "hypertrophy" or the "overgrowth . . . of an organ or part ... resulting from unusually steady or
severe use...."81
A review of the cases indicates that much, though by no means all, of
the litigation that occurs in customer-broker disputes is initiated by brokerage firms, which have drafted the arbitration agreements and have insisted that their customers sign them. To a large degree, the firms initiate
the litigation for the purpose of limiting the authority of the arbitrators or
of keeping the dispute out of arbitration. From the firms' point of view,
the independence of arbitrators from strict compliance with legal rules,
from supervision by a trial court, and from review by an appellate court

creates a risk that a "runaway" panel may unduly favor a claimant. For
example, the extensive litigation over the issue of whether arbitrators
have authority to award punitive damages probably indicates brokerage

firms' fear that a panel's award of damages, including punitive damages,
to a claimant may be based more on sympathy and general considerations
of fairness than on a careful examination of the facts and the law.8 2 As a
tion panel's award because of an arguable difference regarding the meaning
or applicability of laws urged upon it.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986)
(citations omitted). See also Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706
(7th Cir. 1994).
79. To say we afford great deference to the arbitration panel's award is an unIndeed no matter how dubious an arbitrator's decision
derstatement ....
might appear.., if the arbitrator did not stray beyond the four corners of the
agreement to find the essence of his decision, that arbitrator's award must be
This is so regardless that error has been committed or that a
upheld ....
court would reach a contrary conclusion. The parties are entitled to get what
they bargained for-the decision of an arbitrator.
Loughridge v. Allen, No. 93-5099, 1994 WL 258719, at *1 (10th Cir. June 14,1994). For a
discussion of the differences between litigation and arbitration procedures that is highly
critical of arbitration, see Bayer & Abrahams, supra note 75, at 30-32.
80. The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster
than litigation; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business
dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in regards to scheduling
of times and places of hearings and discovery devices ....
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 843 (1995) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 97-542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at 13 (1982)).
81. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1116 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY
1114 (1981)).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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result, brokerage firms, while continuing to include arbitration clauses in
their customer agreements, have resorted to the courts in an effort to

limit the independence and authority of the arbitrators.
As shown in detail in the next part of this Article, arbitration-related
litigation often requires a claimant to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation of procedural issues before his or her claims can be
heard by arbitrators, or it may involve a successful claimant in lengthy
post-hearing litigation. Whether or not brokerage firms initiate arbitration-related litigation for the purpose of deterring customers from pursuing legitimate claims in arbitration, that undoubtedly is its result. Such
litigation runs counter to the principal goal of arbitration: to provide a
speedy and economical forum for the resolution of disputes. By definition, it also reduces arbitration to a secondary status as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism, subordinate in crucial ways to the judicial

system.
IV. AREAS OF ARBITRATION-RELATED LITIGATION
Arbitration-related litigation covers a gamut of legal issues. Among

the most frequently litigated issues are (1) the applicability of the SROs'
six-year time-bar (or "eligibility" rule); (2) the authority of arbitrators to
award punitive damages; (3) the authority of arbitrators to award attor83
neys' fees; and (4) questions relating to choice of forum and venue.

A.

SRo TIME-BARS

In general, an arbitrated claim is subject to the same statute of limita83. Two other issues that are raised in arbitration-related litigation are beyond the
scope of this Article. The first is whether a party that has signed an arbitration agreement
has waived its right to arbitrate by litigating a dispute in court. In keeping with the federal
policy favoring arbitration, the courts are generally reluctant to find a waiver, even though
the party seeking arbitration may have participated in the litigation over a considerable
period of time before attempting to enforce the agreement to arbitrate. Under the federal
courts' most common formulation, a party seeking to establish waiver must prove that its
opponent (1) knew of an existing right to arbitration; (2) acted inconsistently with that
right; and (3) prejudiced the other party by these inconsistent acts. See, e.g., Ritzel Communications, Inc. v. Mid-American Cellular Tel. Co., 989 F.2d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 1992); Van
Ness Townhouses v. Mar Indus. Corp., 862 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1989). In most of the
customer-broker disputes where the issue of waiver is raised, it is the customer who is
attempting to establish that the brokerage firm waived its right to arbitrate.
The second other litigated issue is whether a customer may use the defense of fraud in
the inducement against the brokerage firm's enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate.
The Supreme Court has held that the trial court has the authority to decide the issue only if
the fraud touches the arbitration clause alone, but that the arbitrators have the authority to
decide the issue if the fraud infects the entire contract, including the arbitration clause.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S 395 (1967). The Prima Paint
doctrine has been applied to other contractual defenses, such as duress, undue coercion,
confusion, mutual mistake, overreaching, and unconscionability. Chastain v. RobinsonHumphrey Co., Inc., 957 F.2d 851, 855 (11th Cir. 1992); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, 791 F.2d 850, 854 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391, 398 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (Prima Paintapplies to the defense
of unilateral mistake); Hurlbut v. Gantshar, 674 F. Supp. 385, 391 (D. Mass. 1987) (Prima
Paint applies to a claim of unconscionability).
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tions as would be applicable if the claim were litigated. 84 The statute of
limitations for private claims brought under the Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, the most common legal ground for
claims against broker-dealers under the federal securities laws, is one
year after the plaintiff discovered the facts constituting the violation and
in any event not more than three years after the violation. 85 Statutes of
limitations for state causes of action in securities cases vary considerably,
86
generally ranging from one to six years.
In SRO arbitrations, the statute of limitations prescribed by law is supplemented by an "eligibility" rule. This rule applies to all claims, including statutory claims such as those brought under the federal securities
laws and the RICO statute. 87 The AAA, however, does not have any such
requirement.
The NASD eligibility rule, Section 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure (CAP), 88 provides:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed from
the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or
controversy. This section shall not extend applicable statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case 89
which is directed to arbitration
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
According to the Ruder Report, issued in 1996 by a "policy task force" of
the NASD, Section 15 has "fostered extensive litigation, created great
uncertainty, greatly increased the burdens on the NASD staff, and contributed to erosion of investor confidence in the SRO arbitration forums." 90 The Ruder Report recommended that Section 15 be suspended
for a three-year period, during which the NASD should develop motionpractice procedures for the dismissal of time-barred claims before any
84. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 853 F. Supp. 1023, 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
85. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). Several post-Lampf lower federal court decisions have held that the one-year period begins
running at the time the plaintiff is placed on "inquiry notice" of the facts constituting the
violation, rather than when he or she actually discovers these facts. See, e.g., Chance v.
F.N. Wolf & Co., Inc., No. 93-2390, 1994 WL 529901 (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1994); Tregenza v.
Great Am. Communications Co., 12 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1837
(1994). For a discussion of the post-Lampf cases, see Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R.
Bromberg, SEC Rule 10b-5 and its New Statute of Limitations: The Circuits Defy the
Supreme Court, 51 Bus. LAW. 309, 314-33 (1996). Not all courts, however, have subscribed
to the inquiry notice doctrine. See Douglas v. Tonigan, 830 F. Supp. 457, 460-61 (N.D. Ill.

1993).

86. See POSER, supra note 28, at 405-21, for a discussion of statutes of limitations in
securities actions brought against broker-dealers.
87. As to the applicability of the SROs' eligibility requirements to RICO claims, see
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Allen, No. 93-1575, 1995 WL 8056 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995).
88. This rule has been redesignated as NASD Rule 10304. In May 1996, the NASD
renumbered its rules, including those contained in the Code of Arbitration Procedure.
Since the judicial opinions cited in this Article refer to Section 15, as well as several other
NASD Rules, by their old numbers, the old numbers will be used where necessary for the
sake of clarity. The new rule numbers will be cited in the footnotes.
89. The wording of NYSE Rule 603 and Amex Rule 605(a) is identical to that of Section 15.
90. RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 23.
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hearing on the merits. 9 1 Under this proposal, such motions to dismiss
would be decided by the full arbitration panel, rather than by a single
member of the panel as under present procedures. The Ruder Report
recommendation has aroused considerable controversy, and it is unclear
92
at this time (July 1996) whether it will be adopted.
Section 15 (and its counterparts at the other SROs) has been described
as a method that brokerage firms use in order to extinguish otherwise
valid claims. 93 According to one lawyer (who usually represents plaintiffs
in securities arbitrations): "[The eligibility rule is] a technicality that robs
a possible defrauded investor of any rights whatsoever to bring a case....
It is what gives securities arbitration a bad name." 94 Even if the claim is
not actually extinguished by the application of the eligibility rule, the firm
may dampen the claimant's desire to pursue his claim by involving him in
expensive and time-consuming litigation over the applicability of the
rule. 95
The SROs' eligibility rules have generated a large amount of litigation,
much of it on the question of whether the arbitration panel or the district
court has authority to apply the rules. In general, brokerage firms, hoping to dismiss stale claims before they go to arbitration, argue that the
question is for the courts to decide, while customers usually take the opposite position. The federal courts of appeals that have considered the
question have divided almost evenly. The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that eligibility is a question for the
arbitrators to decide; 96 while the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that it is a question for the courts, 97 as has the
91. Id. at 28-29.
92. Michael Siconolfi, Ruder Proposals Hit Red Tape and Bickering, WALL ST. J., July
22, 1996, at A7; Richard C. Reuben, Investors' Attorneys Find Task Force Report Faulty,
ABA J., Apr. 1996, at 40; Reactions to Ruder Report, 8 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Mar.
1996).
93. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Brokers to Find It Harder to Delay Clientsfrom Arbitrating Disputes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,1994, at B6; Margaret A. Jacobs, Limits on Arbitration
Are Assailed as a Catch-22 Trap for Investors, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, at B7.
94. Dominic Bencivenga, Securities Threshold: Should Judges or Arbitrators Decide
Eligibility?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 9, 1995, at 5 (quoting David E. Robbins, Esq.).
95. See, e.g., PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993). For further
discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
96. PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996); PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk,
81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996); Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 121
(2d Cir. 1991) ("[A]ny limitations defense-whether stemming from the arbitration agreement, arbitration association rule, or state statute-is an issue to be addressed by the arbitrators.") (emphasis added) (citing Conticommodity Servs. Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d
1222, 1224-25 (2d Cir. 1980)); Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1004 (1990); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47
F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1994);
O'Neel v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir. 1993); PaineWebber
Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 1990); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy,
995 F.2d 649, 650 (6th Cir. 1993); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512 (7th
Cir. 1992); PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989); Cogswell v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 94-1482, 1996 WL 77815 (10th Cir. Feb.
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New York Court of Appeals. 98
Most courts holding that the arbitrators should decide whether a claim
is "eligible" for arbitration under NASD Section 15 view thd eligibility
requirement as a kind of statute of limitations, which is essentially procedural. 99 According to this view, the eligibility rule does not raise a question of arbitrability. For example in PaineWebber,Inc. v. Landay,10 0 the
district court pointed out the following:
[There is a distinction] between a) disputes over whether there is any
agreement to arbitrate in the first place ("arbitrability") and b) disputes where a valid arbitration agreement exists but there are secondary questions concerning scope.... [A]ll doubts concerning the
latter should be resolved in favor of arbitration, and, in fact, do not
involve "arbitrability."..... Under this reasoning, timeliness disputes
generated between parties to valid arbitration agreements should
presumptively be resolved through arbitration. 101
These courts emphasize the policy of the FAA in favor of enforcement of
arbitration agreements and the purpose of arbitration to provide the parties to a dispute with a speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before specialists. 10 2 Thus, once the court determines that there is a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties and that the dispute is covered
by the agreement, all questions pertaining to the dispute, including timebar questions, must be decided by the arbitrators.
The courts that hold that the eligibility question is for the courts rather
than the arbitrators to decide focus on the difference between the language of Section 15, which states that stale claims are not "eligible" to be
arbitrated and the language of statutes of limitations, which typically require that an action "be commenced" within a certain time. 10 3 According
to this view, the eligibility of an arbitration claim is not a statute-of-limitations question, to be decided by the arbitrators, but a question of the
arbitrability of the dispute, to be decided by the court. 1°4 Put in other
words, these courts view eligibility as a prerequisite to the arbitrators'
jurisdiction. 10 5 Thus, a claim that is barred by Section 15 is ineligible for
arbitration because it falls outside the scope of the parties' arbitration
23, 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 383 (11th Cir.
1995).
98. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1995).
99. See, e.g., O'Neel, 667 F.2d at 807.
100. 903 F. Supp. 193 (D. Mass. 1995).
101. Id. at 200 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995)).
102. Conticommodity Servs. Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980);
Prudential Sec., Inc. v. LaPlant, 829 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (D. Kan. 1993).
103. See Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 513.
104. But see County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 6-7 (1980)
(under New York law, whether an arbitration is barred by a statute of limitations is a
"threshold question to be resolved by the courts").
105. Elahi, 87 F.3d at 596. ("Five circuits... have interpreted the time bar of section 15
to be a substantive eligibility requirement that constitutes a jurisdictional prerequisite to
arbitration, and thus for the court to apply.").

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

agreement. 0 6
In the recent case of PaineWebber,Inc. v. Bybyk, 107 a divided panel of

the Second' Circuit held that the applicability of the eligibility rule was for
the arbitrators to decide, but the court based its decision on different
grounds from those relied upon by other courts that had come to the
same conclusion. 10 8 The Bybyk court tacitly accepted that applying the
eligibility rule raised the threshold question of arbitrability, and that arbitrability is normally decided by the court, not the arbitrators. The court
held, however, that the parties had agreed that questions of arbitrability
should be heard by the arbitrators. 10 9
The importance of Bybyk lies in the fact that the parties' agreement
was a standard-form customer-broker agreement, many of whose provisions are used in substance by other brokerage firms. In fact, one of the
provisions of the agreement on which the court based its conclusion that
the parties had agreed to arbitrate the question of arbitrability-a provision stating that "the parties are waiving their right to seek remedies in
court"" 0-is required by an NASD rule to be included in the arbitration
clause of every customer agreement."' The other provisions of the
agreement on which the Bybyk court based its opinion were those stating
that (1) "any and all controversies . . .shall be determined by arbitration"; (2) "any arbitration ... shall be ...governed by the [FAA]"; and

(3) "arbitration shall be governed by the rules of the organization convening the panel [in this case, the NASD]."'1 2 Thus, the Second Circuit
held in Bybyk that the standard arbitration clause used by broker-dealers
defeats the presumption that the court will decide questions of arbitrability and constitutes an agreement that the arbitrators will decide
arbitrability, including eligibility questions. 113
106. See, e.g., McCoy, 995 F.2d at 650-51; Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 511. "As a matter of
contract, no party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement to do so. Before compelling an unwilling party to arbitrate, § 4 therefore requires the
court to engage in a limited review to ensure that the dispute is arbitrable." Hartmann,921
F.2d at 511.
107. 81 F.3d 1193 (2d Cir. 1996).
108. Id. at 1201-02.
109. Id. at 1200.
110. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1200.
111. NASD Rule IM-3110(f)(1)(ii) (formerly NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III,
§ 21(f)(1)(ii)). The other SROs have the same rule. SRO rules provide: "No agreement
shall include any condition which limits or contradicts the rules of any [SRO] or limits the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to
make any award." See, e.g., NASD Rule IM-3110(f)(4) (formerly NASD Rules of Fair
Practice, art. III, § 21(0(4)).
112. Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1199. Bybyk also held that the arbitrators had authority to
decide whether the claimant was entitled to attorneys' fees, despite the fact that the arbitration agreement provided that New York law would govern and that New York law provides that attorneys' fees may not be awarded in arbitrations unless the agreement
expressly provides. Id. at 1202. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1218-19 (1995), for the rule
that a choice of law provision will not be construed to impose substantive restrictions on
the parties' rights under the FAA. Id.
113. See also Cowen & Co. v. Technoconsultant Holdings, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 3748(BSJ),
1996 WL 391884 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1996) (discussing and following Bybyk).
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There are also two pragmatic reasons for allowing the arbitration panel
to decide the eligibility issue. First, in many securities cases it is difficult
or impossible to separate the substantive issues of the case from the question of ascertaining the date of the "occurrence or event" that triggered
the claim. Where, for example, the investor claims that the broker was
guilty of a continuing pattern of fraud, a full hearing on the underlying
facts of the case may be necessary in order to determine when the action
accrued. In such cases, "the more efficient resolution is to leave all issues
to the arbitrator."' 1 4 As one district court stated, "attempts to resolve
time-limitation issues will often lead to an entanglement in the merits of
the dispute," an involvement that the courts are enjoined to avoid in
cases where a valid arbitration agreement exists." 5
Second, giving the courts the ability to decide the eligibility issue enables brokerage firms to involve customer-claimants in expensive and
time-consuming litigation before their claims can be heard, even if the
claims are not properly barred by Section 15. It is possible that some
brokerage firms insist on raising the eligibility defense in court for the
very purpose of exhausting the claimants' resources and discouraging
them from pursuing their claims. This may explain why it is almost invariably the customer who argues that the arbitrators should decide the eligibility question, while the brokerage firm contends that the decision
should rest with the court.
The Third Circuit's decision in PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofinann"1 6 demonstrates the reality of both of these concerns. Hofmann opened an account with PaineWebber in 1977 and, between 1982 and 1987, made 118
purchases of the stock of EECO, a small California electronics company.
In 1987, Hofmann executed a margin agreement that contained an arbitration clause. In 1990, EECO filed for bankruptcy protection and the
stock became worthless, and on October 11, 1991, Hofnann filed a demand for arbitration with the NASD." 7 Although a majority of the
purchases occurred more than six years before the date Hofmann initiated the arbitration, Hofmann claimed that all of his losses could be attributed to "occurrences or events" within six years of the demand for
arbitration. Among other things, he argued that his PaineWebber broker
had wrongfully advised him not to sell his EECO stock, that PaineWebber had concealed and made misstatements about the risk of holding the
stock, and that there had been a "unitary pattern of wrongdoing" extending through 1987.118
In response, PaineWebber asked the NASD Director of Arbitration to
114. Goldberg v. Parker, 1995 WL 396568, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Apr. 12, 1995), affd on
other grounds, 634 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 1995).
115. PaineWebber Inc. v. Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649-50 (1986)).
116. 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993).
117. Id. at 1374-75.
118. Id. at 1375.
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dismiss the claim under former NASD Section 15.119 When the Director
refused to do so and stated that the time-bar question would be submitted to the arbitrators to decide, PaineWebber brought an action in federal
court to stay the arbitration of claims that arose from occurrences or
events more than six years before the filing of the arbitration claim. Hofdistrict court granted, and
mann moved for summary judgment, which the
120
PaineWebber appealed to the Third Circuit.
The Court of Appeals, following Third Circuit precedent, held that
NASD Section 15 operated as a substantive bar, limiting the controversies that the parties had agreed to submit to arbitration. Thus, under the
FAA, the court, not the arbitrators, should decide the applicability of Section 15. The court remanded the case, instructing the district court to
conduct a hearing to examine each claim individually, not on the merits
but only to determine which claims were time-barred and which were
not. 12 1 The arbitrators would then hear the claims that were not time122
barred.
Hofinann demonstrates the opportunities for exhaustion of a weaker
opponent that the eligibility requirement provides to a brokerage firm if
the court is to determine its application. The customer in this case, having brought his arbitration claims before the NASD and then forced to
defend against the injunctive suit in both the district court and court of
appeals, would have to return to the district court to litigate the question
of the applicability of the NASD time-bar to each claim. Only then
would the customer have an opportunity to arbitrate the claims before an
NASD arbitration panel. This assumes that there would be no additional
court proceedings, either appealing any of the district court's decisions on
the time-bar question or raising additional issues. 123 Furthermore, as the
Third Circuit conceded in Hofinann, it may in practice be difficult for the
eligibility rule without also ruling
court to rule on the applicability of the
24
on the merits of a particular claim.'
One implication of the "substantive" view of the eligibility requirement
has not been adequately explored. If the court, and not the arbitration
panel, is the proper forum to decide that a claim is barred from arbitration by Section 15, the only basis for making this determination is that the
25
dispute falls outside the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.
This is because a court's sole function under Section 4 of the FAA is to
determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the par119. Now renumbered NASD Rule 10304.
120. Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1375-76.
121. Id. at 1382-83.
122. Id. at 1380-82.
123. On remand, the district court determined that some of the claims were not barred
by Section 15 and sent these claims to arbitration. After a hearing, the arbitration panel
dismissed the claims. Telephone conversation between Emil Bukhman, research assistant
to the author, and Michael Slotznick, counsel to the claimant (Mar. 1996).
124. Hoffman, 984 F.2d at 1381.
125. See Cohen, 62 F.3d at 384 (Section 15 is a "jurisdictional prerequisite to
arbitration").
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ties and whether the particular dispute is covered by the agreement. If
the court decides both questions
affirmatively, it is required to order the
6
12
dispute to arbitration.

It therefore follows that where the court finds a claim to be ineligible
under Section 15, the claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration
agreement. The claimant, not being bound by an arbitration agreement,
should be free to pursue the claim in court, assuming that he is not barred
from doing so by a legal statute of limitations or some other disqualification. The arbitration agreement, however, should not prevent the claimant from litigating his claim, because the court has ruled that the
arbitrators do not have jurisdiction over the claim, which, being more
than six years old, does not fall within the scope of the arbitration

agreement.
The above reasoning, however, has been rejected in most instances in

which it has been raised, 127 although no appellate court has considered
the question of whether a claim barred from arbitration by Section 15

may be litigated in court. In one case, a district court stated:
There is simply no language anywhere in the Client's Agreement
which states that plaintiff may seek relief in federal district court
once it has been determined that his claims are not eligible for arbitration.... Indeed, for us to find that plaintiff could assert his claims

in this forum after having been time-barred from asserting them in
arbitration, would only encourage a plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration to128wait six years and then assert his claims in federal district
court.

The court's reasoning is not persuasive. If the parties' agreement to arbitrate does not cover claims that are barred by the eligibility rule, there
does not seem to be any need for explicit language in the agreement permitting the plaintiff to litigate claims. Moreover, it is unrealistic to suppose that a plaintiff would knowingly wait six years before bringing a
claim, just in order to avoid arbitration. A party who did that might run
126. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1994); Smith Barney,
Harris Upham, Inc. v. Robinson, 12 F.3d 515, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1994).
127. Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.
Tex. 1994); McCoy, 853 F. Supp. at 1033; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Shelapinsky, Civ. A. No. 93-1553, 1994 WL 397123 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994); Piccolo v.
Faragalli, Civ. A. No. 93-2758, 1993 WL 331933 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1993); Castellano v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,321, at
96,536 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1990) (customer not permitted to file arbitration claim with
American Arbitration Association after arbitration with NYSE is barred by eligibility rule,
on grounds that customer has elected the NYSE forum). But see Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co. v. St. Pierre, No. 92 C 5735 1994 WL 11600 (N.D. I11.Jan. 4, 1994) (customer
whose claims are barred from arbitration by Section 15 is permitted to litigate her claims in
court if they are not barred by the legal statutes of limitations); Prudential Sec., Inc. v.
LaPlant, 829 F. Supp. 1239, 1244-45 (D. Kan. 1993) (customer granted leave to file a counterclaim with respect to any claims that are not barred by Section 15).
128. Piccolo, Civ. A. No. 93-2758, 1993 WL 331933, at *2. See also Conroy v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Saunderson
v. Gary Goldberg & Co., 899 F. Supp. 177, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Shelapinsky, Civ. A. No.
93-1553, 1994 WL 397123, at *3.
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a very serious risk of having his or her claims time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations (and his or her attorney might run the risk of
129
being sued for malpractice if the claims were time-barred).
On the other hand, in jurisdictions that hold that the applicability of
Section 15 is a procedural matter for the arbitration forum to decide, the
claimant should not be permitted to litigate any claims that are barred by
Section 15. Since the arbitrators (or the NASD Director of Arbitration)
have taken jurisdiction over the matter and ruled on the time-bar question, the purposes of arbitration would be undermined if the claimant
130
were allowed "a second bite out of the arbitration apple."'
Section 15 and the comparable eligibility rules of other SROs bar the
arbitration of any claim brought more than six years after the "occurrence or event" on which the claim is based. This raises the question
whether the eligibility rules are subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling
that is applicable to statutes of limitations. Under the equitable tolling
doctrine, the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the wrongdoing that gives rise to his
claim.
Most of the courts that hold that eligibility is not a statute of limitations
but a substantive question for the court to decide accept the corollary
proposition that Section 15 cannot be tolled. The eligibility rule thus
"serves as an absolute bar to claims submitted ... more than six years
after the event that gave rise to the dispute," even if the plaintiff could
not have known about the fraud or if the defendant fraudulently concealed the fraud from the plaintiff.131 The courts' reasoning is that since
Section 15 is not a statute of limitations but a substantive contractual limitation on the parties' agreement to arbitrate, it is not subject to modifica132
tion based on equitable considerations.
The Sixth Circuit, which, like the Third and Seventh Circuits, holds that
the courts, not the arbitrators, should decide the eligibility issue, nevertheless permits tolling of the eligibility requirement if the district court
finds, under the relevant state law, that the defendant fraudulently concealed the alleged wrongdoing. 33 In order for there to be fraudulent
concealment, there must be an affirmative act of misrepresentation, unless there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties that gives rise to
129. The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration has proposed that Section 15
be amended to give investors the express option of going to court if their claims are
deemed to be ineligible for arbitration. Siconolfi, supra note 92, at A7.
130. Bakk v. Principal Fin. Sec., Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (D. Minn. 1995).
131. Farnam, 870 F.2d at 1292; Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512-13
(7th Cir. 1992). See RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 22-23.
132. See Prudential Sec. v. Moneymaker, No. Civ.-93-179, 1994 WL 637396 (W.D. Okla.
July 14, 1994).
133. McCoy, 995 F.2d at 651. See also Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981 F.2d 894, 900 (6th
Cir. 1992) (no equitable tolling allowed where the elements of fraudulent concealment (i.e.,
"some affirmative fraudulent act and an additional act to perpetuate the concealment" are

absent)).
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an affirmative duty to disclose material facts. 134 In that case silence or
inaction may constitute fraudulent concealment.
Whether or not equitable tolling is permitted, it is necessary to determine the date of the "occurrence or event" that is the basis for the claim.
Where the claim is based solely on the customer's single purchase of a
security, the occurrence or event is the date of the purchase. 135 On the
other hand, where the event at issue is the defendant's conduct over a
period of time, the trial court (in jurisdictions that authorize the court to
determine the applicability of Section 15) must make a factual inquiry in
136
order to fix the triggering date.
This task is more easily described than performed. For example, the
Third Circuit noted in Hofmann that a customer's claim that his brokerage firm fraudulently concealed its representative's wrongdoing can be
regarded alternatively as an attempt to toll the time period on claims arising out of the underlying wrongdoing or as an independent cause of ac134. Davis v. Keyes, 859 F. Supp. 290, 293 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In Davis, Judge Feikens,
who sixteen years earlier had decided Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978), a leading case on the fiduciary duties of stockbrokers,
held on the basis of Leib that a fiduciary relationship did not exist between the customer
and broker and that therefore the broker's nondisclosure could not be the basis for a
fraudulent concealment claim so as to toll the eligibility period of NASD § 15.
135. PaineWebber Inc. v. Allen, No. 93-1575, 1995 WL 8056 (4th Cir. Jan. 10, 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 52 (1995); Mutual Serv. Corp. v. Spaulding, 871 F. Supp. 324, 328
(N.D. Ill. 1995) (where customer challenged suitability of investments, the "occurrence or
events" which gave rise to the claims were the initial investments); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barnum, 616 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1994) ("[I]n general, the
event which triggers the six-year period is the investment in, or the purchase of, the relevant security.") (citing New York cases).
136. In Hofmann, the Third Circuit set forth a procedure for determining the occurrence or event:
[T]he first step will be to determine whether the parties intended to submit
disputes over the operative occurrence or event, and/or when it occurred, to
arbitration. In resolving this question, the court should look to the language
of the contract and all relevant extrinsic evidence.... In particular, the court
may be aided by evidence of the customs and practices in the industry.
I f the parties intended to submit disputes over what is the relevant occurrence or event, and/or when it occurred, to arbitration, the narrow question
of [what constitutes the relevant occurrence or event] should be sent to an
arbitrator for initial determination .... If the arbitrators determine that the
occurrence or event that gave rise to the particular claim occurred more than
six years before the filing of arbitration, their inquiry as to that claim is at an
end because they have no jurisdiction to consider it on the merits. If, on the
other hand, the arbitrators determine that the occurrence or event was within
six years of [the customer's] arbitration demand, the arbitrators should go on
to rule on the merits of the claim.
If, in contrast, the district court determines that the parties did not intend
to submit disputes over the relevant occurrence or event to arbitration, the
court will have to determine what was the relevant occurrence or event and
when it occurred.
Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1382-83. This description of the procedure, aside from being complex, is not particularly helpful, since it does not deal with the specifics of customers' claims
relating to securities transactions. The procedure was derived from a case involving a labor
arbitration, Morristown Daily Record, Inc. v. Graphic Communications Union, Local 8N,
832 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1987).
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tion based on a duty of the firm to its customers to inform them of the
wrongdoing. 137 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that if a broker
perpetrates a continuing affirmative fraud on customers, such as reporting false values for their investments through bogus statements, the act of
sending out the false statements, rather than the initial purchase of the
investment, may be the occurrence or event giving rise to determining
their claims.' 38 Where a customer claimed that the brokerage firm's representative initially misrepresented the value of his investments and continued furnishing him with monthly account statements that induced him
to hold the investments, the district court refused to determine the triggering "occurrence or event" under Section 15 until a factual inquiry
139
could be held.
Some types of fraud necessarily occur over a period of time. For example, determining the triggering date under Section 15 of a claim that a
brokerage account was churned may require the court to hold an evidentiary hearing. 40 Similarly, where a customer's claims were not limited to
purchases and sales but included claims based on alleged ongoing systemic mismanagement, diversion of funds, misrepresentations, conflict of
interest, and self-dealing, a district court held that any such claim that
occurred within six years prior to the NASD filing should proceed to
41
arbitration.'
Predictably, some courts have reacted against the harshness of denying
equitable tolling and at the same time imposing a bright-line rule that the
triggering occurrence or event is the purchase of the security. As one
New York trial court stated, in a case involving the allegedly fraudulent
sales of limited partnership interests and a continuing pattern of misrepresentation by a broker: "The effect of this interpretation in fraud cases
is to reward the unscrupulous broker-dealer and to penalize the unsophisticated investor who does not discover the fraud for more than six years
after the investment was purchased.' 42 Pointing out that the NASD itself does not take the position that the purchase date is necessarily the
event or occurrence that gave rise to the dispute, 143 the court held as
follows:
137. Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1381-82.
138. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 385 nn.5-6.
139. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Masland, 878 F. Supp. 710, 713-15 (M.D.
Pa. 1995).
140. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Barchman, 916 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. I11.
1996), the district court stated: "[Tihe purchase or sale of any one investment would not of
itself trigger the six-year eligibility period on the churning count. Instead the six-year
clock began to tick as to each Claimant at the point that the trading activity in his or her
account became excessive." Id. at 853.
141. Moneymaker, No. CIV-93-179, 1994 WL 637396, at *2.
142. Goldberg v. Parker, 1995 WL 396568, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Apr. 12, 1995), affd on
other grounds, 634 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 1995).
143. The court quoted the Director of Arbitration of the NASD as follows: "Section 15
does not refer specifically to the purchase date as the time that the six year limitation

begins to run. Therefore it is equally appropriate that the discovery by the claimant be
treated as the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute." Id. at *4.
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The factual issues underlying the computation of the eligibility periods are too closely intertwined with the substantive issues of fraud
and self-dealing... to permit the court to rule as a matter of law on
which date or dates the events occurred giving rise to respondent's
claims.
Rather than the court's holding a hearing on issues of fact,144the
more efficient resolution is to leave all issues to the arbitrator.
This resolution is not only more efficient, but it protects investors who
have signed an arbitration agreement and are willing to comply with it
from being required to engage in bifurcated proceedings.

B.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The question whether punitive damages may be awarded in securities
arbitrations has generated a large volume of litigation in both federal and
state courts. According to the Ruder Report, "No subject has generated
more widespread controversy or resulted in more polarization between
the investor and broker-dealer communities than the appropriateness of
punitive damages in securities arbitration.' 1 45 The reason for the extreme sensitivity of the punitive-damages issue is not altogether clear.
Arbitrators rarely award punitive damages to investors, and the amount
of the punitive damages awarded in these cases is usually only a small
fraction of the amount claimed. 146 The vigor with which brokerage firms
have contested the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages is
probably due less to any actual measurement of the exposure to liability
than to a fear that arbitrators, if told unequivocally that they are free to
award punitive damages, might begin to do so as a matter of course. In
any event, the issue has been the subject of a large amount of litigation.
Although punitive damages are not permitted in lawsuits brought
under the 1934 Act, 147 they are permitted under the laws of most states,
and in appropriate cases federal courts will award punitive damages on
state-law claims under the doctrine of diversity jurisdiction or pendent
jurisdiction. 148 According to the New York Court of Appeals:
[T]here may be a recovery of exemplary damages in fraud and deceit
actions where the fraud, aimed at the public generally, is gross and
144. Id. at *5.
145. RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 35.
146. A 1992 report of the Government Accounting Office found that punitive damages
were requested in 28% of the securities cases decided at SROs and 48% of the cases decided at the AAA; that SRO arbitrators awarded punitive damages in 12% of the decided
cases in which such damages were requested, and AAA arbitrators awarded punitive damages in 9% of the cases in which such damages were requested; and that the median for
such awards was 11% of the amount claimed at the SROs and 5% at the AAA. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS PUB. No. GAO/GGD92-74, SECURIES ARBITRATION: How INVESTORS FARE 45 (1992).

147. The Securities Exchange Act provides that "no person permitted to maintain a suit
for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of

the act complained of." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1994).
148. See POSER, supra note 28, at 392-95.
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involves high moral culpability . . ., where the defendant's conduct
evinced a high degree of moral turpitude and demonstrated such
wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil
obligations.
Exemplary damages are more likely to serve their desired purpose of
deterring similar conduct in a fraud case.., than in any other kind of
tort.... [T]hose who deliberately and coolly engage in a far-flung
fraudulent scheme, systematically conducted for profit, are very
much more likely to pause and consider the consequences if they
have to pay more than the actual loss suffered by an individual
149
plaintiff.
Although the principal securities-arbitration forums do not explicitly
authorize the award of punitive damages by arbitrators, their rules
strongly suggest that punitive damages may be awarded. The NASD
Code of ArbitrationProceduresimply states that the award may consist of
"damages and other relief,"'150 and the rules of the other SROs use similar language. 15 1 Furthermore, the Arbitrator's Manual published by the
Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) tells arbitrators
that they may award punitive damages.' 52 The AAA Securities Arbitration Rules provide that the arbitrator "may grant any remedy or relief
that the arbitrator deems just and equitable .... ",153 The courts have
taken the position that, to the extent that the NASD Code is silent on the
scope of arbitrators' powers, this implies the absence of categorical limitations; 54 and, furthermore, that where the parties agree to arbitration
under the rules of a particular forum, and where arbitration issues involve
interstate commerce, the FAA gives force to the rules of that arbitration
forum.' 55 Thus, an agreement between a brokerage firm and a customer
to arbitrate future disputes under the rules of an SRO or the AAA includes an implied agreement that the arbitrators may award punitive
156
damages.
Plausible arguments can be made both for and against awarding puni149.
150.
151.
152.

Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 492 (N.Y. 1961).
NASD Rule 10330(e).
NYSE Rule 627; Amex § 613.
The issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy.
Generally, in court proceedings, punitive
damages consist of compensation in excess of actual damages and are
awarded as a form of punishment against the wrongdoer. If punitive damages are awarded, the decision of the arbitrators should clearly specify what
portion of the award is intended as punitive damages, and the arbitrators
should consider referring to the authority on which they relied.

SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL

26-

27 (1992).
153. AAA SECURITIES ARBITRATION Rule § 42(c) (1993).

154. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709-10 (7th Cir. 1994).
155. Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 888 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993).
156. Section 4 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 4, confers the "right to obtain an order directing
that 'arbitration proceed in the manner providedfor in [the parties']agreement."' Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1989) (emphasis added).
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tive damages in securities arbitrations. 1 57 Perhaps the strongest argument
for giving arbitrators authority to award punitive damages is the strong
federal policy, reflected in the FAA, for resolving all doubts about arbitrability in favor of arbitration. Thus, arbitrators should be given a maximum degree of flexibility in fashioning suitable remedies. Second, not to
permit arbitrators to award punitive damages in a case where a court
would award punitive damages is inconsistent with the principle expressed by the Supreme Court that an agreement to arbitrate should not
change investors' substantive rights. 158 Thus, it would be unfair to an investor to deprive him of the right to punitive damages, if punitive damages would be available to him in a court action, just because his
brokerage firm requires him to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of opening a brokerage account.
Third, the threat that punitive damages will be awarded in cases where
the defendant's conduct is egregious gives brokerage firms a strong incentive to supervise their salespersons effectively and otherwise to comply
with the securities laws. This is especially true, in view of the fact that
the claims of many customers against brokers involve alleged fraud,
which some authorities regard as a category of undesirable conduct that
punitive damages is particularly likely to deter. The deterrent effect of
punitive damages, on the responsible party as well as on others, in egregious cases of fraud or abuse of trust will be as great if an arbitration
panel imposes the sanction as if a judge or jury imposes it.
Finally, the availability of punitive damages helps enforce the securities
laws by giving investors and attorneys a special incentive to press claims
where reprehensible conduct is involved, even though the size of the
monetary claims may be relatively modest.
Several arguments are likewise made in favor of withholding from arbitrators the power to award punitive damages. First, the absence in arbitrations of any of the restraints on decision-makers that are found in
litigation-the ability of the judge to overturn or modify a jury verdict;
the development of standards through the writing of reasoned opinions,
both as to when punitive damages may be awarded and as to the appropriate amount of punitive damages; and the right of appeal to a higher
court-makes the potential award of punitive damages in arbitrations not
only unpredictable but unfair.' 5 9 Second, the securities industry takes the
position that punishment and deterrence are inconsistent with the pur157. For a summary of the arguments pro and con, see RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at
36-38; G. Richard Shell, The Power to Punish: Authority of Arbitrators to Award Multiple
Damages and Attorneys' Fees, 72 MAss. L. REv. 26, 28-33 (1987); NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 94-54 (July 1994) (enclosing the Report of the Subcomm. on Punitive Damages of the
NASD Legal Advisory Board).
158. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights
afforded by the statute .. "); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231 ("[T]he streamlined procedures
of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights.").
159. To which investors may retort that it was the securities industry, not investors, who
fought for mandatory arbitration, with all of its inherent benefits and drawbacks.
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poses of arbitration and that allowing punitive damages inevitably makes
arbitrations more complex, expensive, and time-consuming. Third, it is
argued that the highly developed enforcement and disciplinary machinery
that exists in the securities area reduces any need there may be for punitive damages as a method of deterring wrongdoing.
Finally, those who oppose punitive damages in arbitration contend that
the power to punish should belong exclusively to the state, not to an independent panel of arbitrators. This was the rationale used by the New
York Court of Appeals in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,160 a case involving
the alleged breach of a publishing contract, for holding that arbitrators
have no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the
parties. 161 In view of the fact that arbitration is often forced on unsophisticated investors by large brokerage firms, it is ironic that the court based
its decision in part on the supposition that a party with superior bargaining power might be able to manipulate an arbitration panel in order to
gain an award of punitive damages:
Punitive sanctions are reserved to the State, surely a public policy 'of
such magnitude as to call for judicial intrusion'. . . . The evil of permitting an arbitrator whose selection is often restricted or manipulatable by the party in a superior bargaining position, to award punitive
damages is that it displaces the court and the jury, and therefore the
State, as the engine for imposing a social sanction.
Parties to arbitration agree to the substitution of a private tribunal
for purposes of deciding their disputes without the expense, delay
and rigidities of traditional courts. If arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the usefulness of arbitration would be destroyed. It would become a trap for the unwary given the eminently
desirable freedom from judicial overview of law and facts. It would
mean that the scope of determination by arbitrators, by the license to
award punitive damages, would be both unpredictable and uncontrollable. It would lead to a Shylock principle of doing business without a Portia-like escape from the vise of a logic foreign to arbitration
law.162
Undoubtedly influenced by New York's prohibition of punitive damages awards by arbitrators, many brokerage firms have inserted a New
York choice-of-law provision in their customer agreements, regardless of
the residence of the customer or the location of the office of the firm that
handled the customer's account. A split of authority among the federal
courts of appeal developed on the question whether such a choice-of-law
provision deprived arbitrators of the authority to award punitive
damages.
160. 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
161. Id. at 794.
162. Id. at 795-96 (citation omitted) (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. N.Y. State
Chapter, Inc. (Savin Bros.), 335 N.E.2d 859, 860 (N.Y. 1975)).
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The Second Circuit held that the FAA required private agreements to
be enforced according to their terms and that the inclusion of a New York

choice-of-law provision implied an intention by the parties to be bound

by Garrity.163 Thus, the parties had by agreement excluded the award of

punitive damages from the arbitrators' authority. 164

The Eleventh Circuit held, on the other hand, that a New York choiceof-law clause merely designated the substantive law that the arbitrators
were required to apply in determining whether the parties' conduct warranted an award of punitive damages, but that New York arbitrationlaw
165
(including Garrity) had no application in cases arising under the FAA.
Similarly, in Pyle v. Securities U.S.A., Inc.,166 a federal district court held
that a Colorado statute providing that "unless otherwise provided by law,
exemplary damages shall not be awarded in administrative or arbitration
proceedings" was preempted by the FAA. 167 The court stated:
[A]bsent an agreement by the parties that state arbitration law
should govern, state arbitration law restricting an arbitrator's power

to award punitive damages does not apply to an action under the
FAA.
... [W]hether an arbitrator may award punitive damages is a matter
central, not collateral, to the agreement to arbitrate. Moreover,...
federal, not state law, applies 168
in determining whether an arbitrator

may award punitive damages.

163. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991). See
also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212;
Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942 (1991).
164. Barbier, 948 F.2d at 122.
165. Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1388 (11th Cir. 1988). See
also Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883, 888-89 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 906 (1993); Todd
Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1061-63 (9th Cir. 1991); Raytheon Co.
v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1989); J. Alexander Sec., Inc. v.
Mendez, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 830 (Cal Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2182 (1994).
166. 758 F. Supp. 638 (D. Colo. 1991).
167. Id. at 639.
168. Id. at 639-40 (citations omitted) (citing Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11-12 n.5). It is not
clear from the Pyle opinion whether the parties' agreement contained a Colorado choiceof-law clause that did not refer specifically to Colorado arbitration law or whether the
agreement did not contain a choice-of-law clause.
It may be questioned whether Garrity, a contract case, should be applied automatically
in cases involving intentional torts, including securities fraud or other types of brokerdealer abuse of their customers. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit raised this question
in a case involving a defamation claim by an employee against a brokerage firm:
Occasional statements that punitive damages are disfavored in arbitration...
must be read in context. Most arbitrations concern contract interpretation,
and it is untraditional and still infrequent to award punitive damages for
breach of contract. "[T]he traditional unavailability of punitive or exemplary damages in arbitration can... be traced to the common law notion that
punitive damages are not available in the standard action for breach of contract ....
Here we have the unusual case of a tort arbitration, and punitive
damages are commonly awarded for certain torts, including defamation. ...
Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1994) (alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI,
REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 436 (2d ed. 1991)). See also Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 623 N.Y.S.2d 560, 564-65 (App. Div. 1995).
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The policy arguments for and against the award of punitive damages in
arbitration must yield, however, to the question whether the parties
agreed to allow such an award. In view of the contractual nature of
arbitration, "parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agree-

ments as they see fit."' 169

The courts have generally assumed that the

parties can by agreement either give the arbitrators the authority to
award punitive damages or to withhold that authority from them, and
that, in the absence of a choice-of-law clause or some other express or
implied restriction in the parties' agreement, the FAA does not prevent
arbitrators in an SRO or AAA arbitration from awarding punitive damages. 170 These assumptions were reinforced by the Supreme Court's
eight-to-one decision in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,

Inc.,171 a case that dealt with but did not finally resolve the controversy
over the availability of punitive damages in securities arbitrations.
In Mastrobuono, the plaintiffs signed an agreement with Shearson that
contained two provisions relevant to the dispute before the court: first,
that the agreement "shall be governed by the laws of the State of New
York"; and, second, that any controversy arising out of the transactions
between the parties shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
rules of the NASD. 172 The plaintiffs were Illinois residents, the registered
representative who serviced the plaintiffs' account worked out of a Shearson branch office in Texas, and "the most significant contacts in this case
were with Illinois. '' 173 Thus, in the absence of the choice-of-law provision, New York law would not have governed the agreement. The plaintiffs filed arbitration claims, alleging that the defendants had mishandled
their account, and a panel conducted hearings in Illinois and awarded the
plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages. 174 Shearson moved to vacate the award of punitive damages on the grounds that the New York
choice-of-law provision in the agreement deprived the arbitrators of the
authority to award punitive damages.
In analyzing this question, the Supreme Court first observed that if a
similar contract, without a choice-of-law provision, had been signed in
New York and was to be performed in New York, the laws of New York
would apply, even though the contract did not expressly so state:
In such event, there would be nothing in the contract that could possibly constitute evidence of an intent to exclude punitive damages
169. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
170. See Baravati, 28 F.3d at 709. The courts' permitting arbitrators to award punitive
damages despite a New York choice-of-law provision "would enforce a provision in an
arbitration clause that forbade the arbitrator to award punitive damages." Id. (emphasis in
original). See Fahnestock & Co., 935 F.2d at 518 ("If the parties had agreed to permit the
arbitrators to make [a punitive damages] award, federal arbitration law might require

confirmation .... ).
171. 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority. Justice
Thomas wrote the dissent.
172. Id. at 1216-17. The agreement provided, alternatively, that arbitration could be
held under the rules of the NYSE or the Amex. Id. at 1217.
173. Mastrobuono, 20 F.3d at 715.
174. Id.
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claims. Accordingly, punitive damages would be allowed because, in
the absence of contractual175intent to the contrary, the FAA would
preempt the Garrity rule.
The Court stated that the New York choice-of-law provision in the
agreement might not preclude punitive damages because New York allows its courts, though not its arbitrators, to enter such awards. 176 The
choice-of-law provision did not unequivocally exclude punitive damages
claims because it might be interpreted to include only New York's sub-

stantive rights and obligations, not the State's allocation of power be-

tween alternative tribunals. 177 Furthermore, the Court's interpretation of
only decision-maker arguably entithe contract "accords with that of the
1 78
tled to deference-the arbitrator.'

Turning to the arbitration provision, the Court stated that the language
strongly implied that a punitive damages award was appropriate. 179 The
provision explicitly authorized arbitration in accordance with NASD
rules, which indicated that arbitrators may award "damages and other
relief.' 180 "While not a clear authorization of punitive damages, this pro-

vision appears broad enough to at least contemplate such a remedy....
At most, the choice-of-law clause introduces an ambiguity into an arbitra81

tion agreement that would otherwise allow punitive damages awards.'
In resolving the ambiguity, the Court first cited the federal policy
favoring arbitration and mandating that ambiguities as to the scope of the
175. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1217. At least one New York trial judge has chosen to
ignore the Supreme Court's statement that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
the FAA would preempt the Garrityrule. The court held that a customer who arbitrated a
dispute before the AAA in New York pursuant to the rules of the American Stock Exchange (the "Amex Window") was not entitled to punitive damages. The court stated:
Mastrobuono does not require a contrary result. The decision in Mastrobuono was based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of the parties'
arbitration agreement. The Court wrote that "the case before us comes
down to what the contract has to say about the arbitrability of petitioners'
claim for punitive damages." In contrast, the case before me obviously does
not involve the interpretation of the parties' contract since there is none.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Trimble, 631 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (quoting
Mastrobuono, 115 S.Ct. at 1216). In a footnote, the court stated that even if the parties
had made an arbitration agreement containing a New York governing-law clause, the court
would not be bound to interpret it in the same way as the Supreme Court did in Mastrobuono, since the interpretation of contracts is a matter of state law. Trimble, 631
N.Y.S.2d at 217 n.4.
Unsurprisingly, other courts have been more willing to follow Mastrobuono. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v.
Landay, 903 F. Supp. 193, 204-05 (D. Mass. 1995); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Richardson, No.
94CIV-3104(AGS), 1995 WL 236722, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995).
176. Mastrobuono, 115 S.Ct. at 1217.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1217 n.4.
179. Id. at 1218.
180. The NASD arbitration rules do not explicitly state whether punitive damages may
be awarded. In specifying the required contents of the arbitrators' written and signed
award, the rules state that the award "shall contain . .. the damages and other relief
awarded." NASD Rule 10330(e) (formerly CAP Rule 41(e)).
181. Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1218.
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arbitration clause must be resolved in favor of arbitration. 182 The Court
then applied two rules of contractual interpretation in support of its conclusion that the parties' agreement did not rule out punitive damages.
First, ambiguous language should be construed against the drafter:
Respondents drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now
claim the benefit of the doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect
the party who did not choose the language from an unintended or
unfair result. That rationale is well-suited to the facts of this case.
As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were actually
aware of New York's bifurcated approach to punitive damages, or
that they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to
arbitrate
disputes they might be giving up an important substantive
183
right.
Second, a document should be read to give effect to all its provisions and
to render them consistent with each other. 184
We think the best way to harmonize the choice-of-law provision with
the arbitration provision is to read "the law of the State of New
York" to encompass substantive principles that New York courts
would apply, but not to include special rules limiting the authority of
arbitrators. Thus, the choice-of-law provision covers the rights and
duties of the parties, while the arbitration185
clause covers arbitration;
neither sentence intrudes upon the other.
Mastrobuono did not hold that the parties to a customer-broker agreement could not deprive the arbitrators of the authority to award punitive
damages if they wished to do so, but rather that it was not clear that the
particular agreement between these parties had excluded punitive damages. Since, under the strong proarbitration interpretation that the courts
have given the FAA, a party wishing to restrict the scope of an arbitration
agreement has the burden of showing that the restriction was the intention of the parties, the agreement's lack of clarity worked in favor of permitting the arbitrators to award punitive damages. In view of the
adhesive nature of most customer-broker arbitration agreements and the
inequality of bargaining power that typically exists between the parties to
such agreements, Mastrobuono's application of rules of contractual construction so as to support the customer's position seems fully justified. 186
Mastrobuono left open the possibility, however, that a brokerage firm
could draft a standard-form agreement for its customers to sign that
would clearly and unequivocally deprive the arbitrators of the authority
182. Id. at 1218 n.7.
183. Id. at 1219 (footnote omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. One writer has taken the position that the Mastrobuono decision is "legally insupportable" because it disregards the contractual intent of the parties. Kenneth R. Davis,
Protected Right or Sacred Rite: The Paradox of FederalArbitration Policy, 45 DEPAUL L.
Rnv. 65, 98 (1995). Nevertheless, Professor Davis concedes that the decision "serves societal interests" in two ways: First, by increasing the scope of arbitable issues, the decision
tends to lighten the judiciary's burden; and, second, it avails injured arbitrating parties the
same relief as a court might grant. Id. at 99.
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to award punitive damages. Such an agreement presumably would be
valid and enforceable, assuming that the federal regulators were willing
to permit it. Mastrobuono thus moved the controversy about punitive
damages in arbitrations from the judicial to the regulatory arena.
Soon after the Mastrobuono decision, the NASD warned its members
that it would be a. violation of NASD rules to attempt to limit the authority of arbitrators to make an award, by a governing-law clause or by any
other provision in a customer agreement. 187 The NASD pointed out that
the agreements used by some member firms contained predispute arbitration provisions that were inconsistent with Article III, Section 21(f) of the
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, 188 the rule that specified the contents of
such provisions, and it urged members to take prompt steps to ensure
that their customer agreements fully complied with the rule. 1 89 In particular, the NASD cited with approval the SEC's position that Section 21(f)
had the force of federal law and that any customer agreement signed after September 7, 1989, the effective date of Section 21(f), was not enforceable if it was inconsistent with this section. 90 Implicit in this
warning was the NASD's view that any member who used a customer
agreement that deprived arbitrators of the authority to award punitive
damages would be in violation of NASD rules. 19'
Some members of the securities industry reacted with hostility to the
NASD's warning, regarding it as an unwarranted attempt to dictate to
members the terms of their customer arbitration agreements so as to preserve arbitrators' authority to award punitive damages. One securities
lawyer went so far as to suggest that industry members should bring legal
action against the NASD for misinterpreting arbitration rules and making
rule changes without making a formal rule proposal. NASD officers
took the position that its interpretation of Section 21(f) was not a new
92
interpretation. 1
Several proposals have been made to legislatively or administratively
restrict the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages. In 1993, a
187. Predispute Arbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements, in NASD NOTICE TO
95-16 (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter NASD NOTIcE]. The NASD Rules of Fair Practice provide: "No agreement shall include any condition which limits or contradicts the
rules of any self-regulatory organization or limits the ability of a party to file any claim in
arbitration or limits the ability of the arbitrators to make any award." NASD Rule IM3110(f)(4) (formerly NASD Code of Fair Practice, art. III, § 21(f)(4)).
188. Now redesignated NASD Rule IM-3110(f).
189. See PredisputeArbitration Clauses in Customer Agreements, supranote 187, at 101.
190. The NASD pointed out that the customer agreement in question in Mastrobuono
was signed by the customer before the effective date of § 21(f). The NASD suggested that
a governing-law clause in an agreement signed after that date would not merit the deference that the Mastrobuono Court gave to the governing-law clause. Id.
191. The NASD Notice to Members reminded members that in Mastrobuono the U.S.
Solicitor General and the SEC argued to the Supreme Court that "NASD Rule 21(f)(4)
forbids the inclusion in broker-client arbitration agreements of provisions limiting the ability of arbitrators to award relief that would be available in a judicial forum." NASD NoTICE, supra note 187.
192. Michael Siconolfi, Brokers Advised to Skirt Ruling on Arbitration, WALL ST. J.,
May 2, 1995, at C1.
MEMBERS
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New York bar committee proposed limiting the amount of punitive dam193
ages to double, or at most treble, the compensatory damages awarded.
A year later, the report of an NASD advisory committee showed signs of
panic concerning the alleged threat of punitive damages. The report
made a laundry list of recommendations, including the following: (1)
written decisions in all cases of punitive damages awards; (2) a right to
appeal such awards; (3) an "offer of judgment" rule, which would require
a claimant to pay the respondent's costs if the final judgment awarded
was less than the amount of any offer made by the respondent and turned
down by the claimant; (4) a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
proof in support of any punitive damages award; (5) a dollar cap of
$250,000 or the same amount as the compensatory damages awarded; (6)
a separate proceeding for the determination of punitive damages; and (7)
a requirement that most of the punitive damages awarded be paid to the
government or the regulators rather than to the claimant. 9 4 Following
the publication of the NASD report, little more was heard about it. Presumably the general lack of acceptance of the report was due both to its
almost complete failure to recognize the legitimate interests of defrauded
investors and the fact that implementation of several of the recommendations would require amending the FAA and would impose complex legal
procedures on arbitration, stripping it of some of its unique advantages of
speed and economy.
The Ruder Report, reflecting the views of the bar (including former
regulators), the securities industry, and academia, took a more evenhanded, albeit still restrictive, approach to the subject of punitive damages. Recognizing that punitive damages serve a legitimate public
interest, the Report recommended the following: (1) punitive damages
should remain available, subject to a cap; (2) the cap should be the lesser
of $750,000 or twice the compensatory damages awarded; (3) an award
that includes both compensatory and punitive damages should specify the
amount of each and that, where requested by the party against whom the
punitive-damages award is rendered, the arbitrators should be required
to prepare a written document describing the conduct that gave rise to
the award; and (4) punitive damages should be available in arbitration to
the same extent as they are available in the courts of the state of the
claimant's residence, so that "investors will be no better or worse off than
if they had brought their claim to a judicial forum."'1 95
193. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON ARBITRATION AND ADR OF THE NEW YORK COUNTY

LAWYERS' Ass'N (July 12, 1993). This report also proposed a legislative reversal of the
Garrity rule, judicial review of punitive damages awards, and a requirement that arbitrators awarding punitive damages prepare a written decision stating the reasons for the
award.
194. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE NASD LEGAL ADVISORY BOARD (July 1994).
195. RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 40-46. The Ruder Committee's recommendation for a specific cap on punitive damages, whatever its merits, is inconsistent with its
recommendation that punitive damages should be available to the same extent as they are
in state courts.
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It is too early at the time of this writing (August 1996) to know whether
the Ruder Report's recommendations on punitive damages will be imple-

mented by the NASD's adoption of new rules and the other SRO arbitration forums and, if such rules are adopted, whether the SEC will approve

them.196 Until this matter is finally resolved, it is likely that litigation

over the authority of securities arbitrators to award punitive damages will
continue, thus detracting from the ability of arbitral forums to provide
investors and brokers with speedy and economical resolution of their
disputes.
C.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Under the so-called "American Rule," which is well established in both
federal and state courts, each party in litigation pays its own attorneys'
fees, unless one of the traditionally recognized exceptions to the rule is
applicable. 197 Under the American Rule, a successful party in court litigation cannot collect its attorneys' fees from the losing party in the absence of an express statutory authorization or an enforceable contract to
the contrary or unless the losing party willfully disobeyed a court order or
198
conducted litigation improperly, frivolously, or in bad faith.
There are two separate questions relating to the award of attorneys'
fees in connection with arbitrations. First, do arbitrators have authority
to award attorneys' fees? Second, to what extent will a court award attorneys' fees to deter or punish frivolous arbitration-related litigation?
196. The Ruder Report's recommendation for a $750,000 cap on punitive damages has
been criticized by both representatives of investors and representatives of brokerage firms.
One plaintiffs' attorney told the press that the proposed maximum award "is not even a
slap on the wrist for [brokerage firms] and, in most cases, won't have any deterrent value."
Richard C. Reuben, Investors' Attorneys Find Task Force Report Faulty, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1996, at 40-41 (quoting Theodore G. Eppenstein, a partner of Eppenstein & Eppenstein).
But a partner of a law firm that represents brokerage firms stated: "Some think the cap's
too high, some might object to the lack of standards." Id. at 41 (quoting W. Reese Bader, a
partner of Orrick, Harrington & Sutcliffe). In July 1996, the Wall Street Journal reported
that the Securities Industry Association, the trade group of the securities industry, was
seeking a $250,000 cap. Michael Siconolfi, Ruder ProposalsHit Red Tape and Bickering,
supra note 92, at A7; SIA Tells NASD It Would Accept Cap on Punitive Damages in Arbitration,28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 763 (June 14, 1996). The bipartisan criticism may be
the sign of a good compromise or an indication that the recommendation is deeply flawed.
197. The leading case stating the American Rule is Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). See also York Research Corp. v. Landgarten, 927 F.2d
119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]here is a general presumption against fee-shifting in American
courts.").
198. Menke v. Monchecourt, 17 F.3d 1007, 1009 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Absent statutory authorization or contractual agreement between the parties, the prevailing American rule is
that each party ... pays his own attorneys' fees."); Smith v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 846 F.
Supp. 978, 981 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("Courts in general.., have been reluctant to grant attorneys' fees in cases where no contractual or statutory basis has been provided for the award
of these fees."); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (M.D. Fla.
1993); see also Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2675 (1994); Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs. v. United States Dep't of Educ.,
979 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6th Cir. 1992); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, 943 F.2d 1056,
1064 (9th Cir. 1991); Marshall & Co. v. Duke, No. 1:94-CV-3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468, at *8
(N.D. Ga. July 27, 1995).
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Both questions have been the source of a considerable amount of

litigation.
1.

Awards of Attorneys' Fees by Arbitrators

While the FAA neither authorizes nor prevents the award of attorneys
fees by arbitrators, 199 there is some authority that the American Rule
applies only to litigation in court and not to arbitration, thus not con-

straining arbitrators who wish to award attorneys' fees. 200 The key question, however, is not whether arbitrators have inherent power to award

attorneys' fees but whether the parties' agreement authorized the arbitrators to make such an award.20 ' Presumably, if the parties did not expressly provide for the award of attorneys' fees in their agreement, it may
be inferred that they intended to follow the American Rule. In other
words, the American Rule creates a presumption that the parties did not
give the arbitrators the power to award attorneys' fees unless one of the
exceptions to the rule applies.
The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules do not permit the award
of attorneys' fees in arbitrations. 20 2 In PaineWebber, Inc. v. Richardson,20 3 a district court in New York held that a New York choice-of-law

provision in a customer-broker agreement precluded arbitrators from
awarding attorneys' fees unless such an award was expressly authorized
204
in the agreement.
Richardson was decided shortly after the Supreme Court held in Mastrobuono that a New York choice-of-law provision in a customer-broker
agreement did not foreclose the arbitrators from awarding punitive damages. 205 The court distinguished attorneys' fees from punitive damages
199. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Richardson, No. 94CIV3104(AGS), 1995 WL 236722, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995).
200. Tennessee Dep't of Human Servs., 979 F.2d at 1169.
201. See, e.g., Eljer Mfg., 14 F.3d at 1257 (court does not need to decide whether the
American Rule applies because the arbitrator's award of attorneys' fees was within his
authority).
202. The New York statute provides:
Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including attorney's fees,
incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the
award. The court, on application, may reduce or disallow any fee or expense
it finds excessive or allocate it as justice requires.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7513 (McKinney 1962).
203. No. 94CIV3104(AGS), 1995 WL 236722 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1995).
204. "[C]ourts in New York have held that arbitrators do not have the authority to
award attorneys' fees unless such an award is expressly authorized in the arbitration agreement." Id. at *3. The Richardson court stated that its decision would "effectuate the reasoning of [Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1995)] and
Mastrobuono in a consistent fashion." Id. at *4. In Luckie, the New York Court of Appeals held that the FAA did not preempt a New York choice-of-law provision in an agreement containing an arbitration clause. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d at 1314. See also Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barnum, 616 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. L. & R. § 7513 prevents the award of attorneys' fees in arbitration, unless they are
provided for in the agreement to arbitrate).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 171-79.
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on the basis of the different expectations of the parties:
[A] party to an agreement cannot under our system of laws ordinarily assume that they [sic] will receive an award of attorneys' fees if
that party prevails in a dispute arising from the agreement, absent
explicit provision for such an award by separate agreement or by
statute, in the same fashion as they might reasonably expect that they
entitled to recover traditional damages, including punitive
would be 206
damages.
The court also pointed out a second, very pragmatic distinction between punitive damages and attorneys' fees: the first are awarded only to
parties making claims, while the second may be awarded either to plaintiffs or to defendants. The court stated:
[T]o apply Mastrobuono literally to the issue of attorneys' fees,
though such an approach might benefit [the customer] in this action,
would in fact work an injustice upon unsuspecting customers of brokerage firms. It is unlikely that most persons who enter into brokerage customer agreements suspect that they may be liable for the
attorneys' fees of the brokerage firm if that firm prevails in an arbimantration arising under the customer agreement-the outcome
20 7
dated if we were to endorse [the customer's] position.
Not all courts, however, saw (or were impressed by) the subtle relationship between the Mastrobuono decision and the issue of attorneys' fees.
Three months after Richardson, the threat to a customer of being ordered
to pay substantial attorneys' fees of a brokerage firm against whom the
customer brought an arbitration claim was made patently clear. In Marshall & Co. v. Duke,20 8 a district court in Georgia upheld an arbitration
panel's award of $634,107 in attorneys' fees in favor of a brokerage firm
against several investors who had brought an NASD arbitration against
the firm. The court stated approvingly that the panel had based its award
of attorneys' fees on three different sources of power. 20 9 First, both parties had affirmatively sought an award of attorneys' fees from the panel.
Having agreed to submit all fee issues to arbitration, a party could not
210
now claim that the arbitrators lacked the power to decide these issues.
Second, the NASD rules and Uniform Submission Agreement provide
for submission of all disputes by the parties to arbitration, implicitly including disputes over fee awards. 21 ' Third, the bad-faith exception to the
American Rule was applicable to "quasi-judicial" as well as judicial
bodies. 212
206. Richardson, No. 94CIV3104(AGS), 1995 WL 236722, at *4.
207. Id.
208. No. 1:94-CV-3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468 (N.D. Ga. July 27, 1995).
209. Id. at *5.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
For a discussion of the issues raised by the Marshall case, see Peter W. Schneider, Awards
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs to PrevailingRespondents in SecuritiesArbitrations,SEc. ARB.
COMMENTATOR, Feb. 1996, at 1 (Mr. Schneider is a partner in Rogers & Hardin, the law
firm that represented Marshall & Co.). See also Milo Geyelin, Ruling in Meritless Lawsuit
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Although few, if any, standard-form customer-broker agreements expressly authorize the award of attorneys' fees, most agreements provide
that arbitration will be conducted under the rules of one or more SROs,
or under the Securities Arbitration Rules of the AAA. All of these rules
include broad remedial provisions, which some courts have construed to
authorize the award of attorneys' fees. 213 Courts have also held that signing and filing the Uniform Submission Agreement used by the SROs im2 14
plicitly authorizes the arbitrators to award attorneys' fees.
Furthermore, the NASD Arbitrators' Manual advises that a panel may
award attorneys' fees in "an exceptional case."' 21 5 Finally, courts have
held that a party who himself requests an arbitration panel to order his
opponent to pay his attorneys' fees waives his right to object when the
panel orders him to pay his opponent's fees. 216 In effect, by requesting
the arbitration panel to make an award of attorneys' fees, a party tacitly
admits the panel's authority to make such an award and thus is prevented
from arguing that the panel does not have this authority.
The courts' principal basis for upholding arbitrators' decisions to award
attorneys' fees is the deference to be shown to the arbitrators. Arbitrators have broad power to fashion appropriate remedies including the
award of attorneys' fees.2 17 Thus, a court will not vacate an arbitral decision to award (or, alternatively, not to award) attorneys' fees unless the
complaining party has made a showing that the arbitrators either clearly
21 8
exceeded their power or acted in a completely irrational manner.
Likewise, the arbitrators' determination of the amount of attorneys' fees
to be awarded is a finding of fact, which the court must accept. 21 9 In the
area of attorneys' fees, as in other areas, the court will defer to the arbitrator's decision on factual and legal questions falling within the arbitraCase Seen Sending Message to Investor, Arbitration Case Sends Investors Message, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 5, 1995, at B5.
213. See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 242-43 (1st Cir. 1995)
(NYSE Rule 629(c), which provides that arbitrators may award costs and expenses of the
parties "unless applicable law directs otherwise," authorizes arbitrators to award attorneys'
fees); Marshall & Co. v. Duke, No. 1:94-CV-3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468 (N.D. Ga. July 27,
1995); see also Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1064 (9th Cir.
1991) (attorneys' fees allowed where arbitration agreement incorporated AAA Commercial Rule 43, which states that the arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the parties' agreement). But see
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Depew, 814 F. Supp. 1081, 1083-84 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (Rule 43
does not authorize arbitrators to award punitive damages, in the absence of an express
authorization of such award in the parties' agreement).
214. Marshall& Co., No. 1:94-CV-3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468 (N.D. Ga. July 27, 1995);
First Interregional Equity Corp. v. Haughton, 842 F. Supp. 105, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The Uniform Submission Agreement states in part: "The undersigned parties hereby submit the present matter in controversy, as set forth in the attached statement of claim . . . to
arbitration [in accordance with the rules of the SRO]." Haughton, 842 F. Supp. at 112.
215. Marshall & Co., No. 1:94-CV-3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468, at *7.
216. Id.; Glennon v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 3-93-0847, 1994 WL 757709, at
*10 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 1994); Haughton, 842 F. Supp. at 112.
217. Todd Shipyards, 943 F.2d at 1064.
218. Haughton, 842 F. Supp. at 113; see also Tanner, 72 F.3d at 243.
219. R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
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tors' authority, and will confirm the arbitrators' award if it can find a
rational basis for it.220
On the other hand, if the arbitrators has clearly acted beyond their

authority, a court will overturn the decision concerning the issue of attorneys' fees. An example of such a case is Davis v. PrudentialSecurities,
Inc.,221 where an arbitration panel awarded the plaintiff $783,684 in com-

pensatory and punitive damages on six of his claims, but ruled that each
party should pay its own attorneys' fees. The plaintiff asked the district
court to modify the panel's denial of attorneys' fees, arguing that the arbitrators had exceeded their authority because the issue of attorneys' fees
had not been submitted to them. Under the then-applicable Florida law,
arbitrators had no authority to award attorneys' fees; only the court could
do this, in a post-award confirmation proceeding.2 22 The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court had erred in confirming the arbitrators'
award because the arbitrators had exceeded their powers by deciding the
issue.2 23 The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for
2 24

consideration of the issue of attorneys' fees under the Florida statute.

Despite the deference that courts usually exhibit to arbitrators' decisions, they will not confirm an arbitral award of attorneys' fees if they
cannot understand it. For example, where a panel awarded a party "all

damages and expenses incurred" as a consequence of the other party's
failure to discharge certain guarantees, the Second Circuit remanded the

case to the district court with instructions to seek clarification from the
arbitrators as to whether they meant the word "expenses" to include attorneys' fees. 225 The court declined to give "expenses" a broad reading,
citing "the general presumption against fee-shifting in American
220. Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2675 (1994); Thornton v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 92-35116, 1993 WL
425961, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 1993) (court's power to review arbitrators' award is limited);
Jeppsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1130, 1139-40 (D. Utah 1995)
(even if arbitrators erred in awarding attorneys' fees under Utah Code, this would be a
mistake of fact or law and therefore not subject to review); Marshall& Co., No. 1:94-CV3494-JE, 1995 WL 714468, at *8 (an award of attorneys' fees will be vacated as "arbitrary
and capricious" only if a ground for the award cannot be inferred from the facts of the
case); Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. v. Neurosurgical Assocs. of Ind., 896 F. Supp. 844,
849-50 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (court will not disturb arbitrators' award of attorneys' fees in case
brought under ERISA, since ERISA can be interpreted to allow for attorneys' fees).
221. 59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
222. The arbitration panel had calculated Davis's compensatory award pursuant to a
Florida statute, which, at the time of the arbitration, had been interpreted by the Florida
courts so as to compel the court to award attorneys' fees to the "prevailing party unless the
court finds that an award of such fees would be unjust." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.211(6)
(West 1988); Davis, 59 F.3d at 1194. In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff clearly was the prevailing party, even though he did not succeed on all of his
claims, which were based on alternative theories of liability. Davis, 59 F.3d at 1195. The
Florida Court of Appeals subsequently held that arbitrators could award attorneys' fees
where the parties expressly agreed to submit this issue to arbitration. Id. at 1194, 1195
n.10.
223. Id. at 1195.
224. Id.at 1196.
225. York Research Corp. v. Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1991).
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226

Similarly, a district court in Florida refused to award attorneys' fees
under the Florida statute that authorized the court to make such an
award, where the arbitration panel did not indicate whether its award of
damages to the claimant was based on his statutory claims, which entitled
227
him to attorneys' fees, or on his common law claims, which did not.
Because the panel "gave no indication of the type of claim the award was
based upon, the predicate has not been laid for this court to award attor'228
neys' fees.
2. Awards of Attorneys' Fees in Arbitration-RelatedLitigation
The award of attorneys' fees incurred in a successful defense of a motion to vacate an arbitration award, or in connection with other arbitration-related litigation, is usually based on the "bad faith" exception to the
American Rule. Under this exception, a court may award attorneys' fees
against a party who has asserted a frivolous claim, defense, or appeal or
who has otherwise abused the litigation process. 2 29 The award of attorneys' fees is one way that the courts can deter parties (and their attorneys) from initiating unnecessary arbitration-related litigation.
The strong federal policy in favor of arbitration and the limited scope
of judicial review of arbitrators' awards under the FAA tend to reduce
the courts' willingness to tolerate litigants' attempts to avoid arbitration
or to vacate or modify awards. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has established a rebuttable presumption that a party who unsuccessfully challenges an arbitrator's award lacks substantial justification and therefore
2 30
must pay the opposing side's attorneys' fees.
2 31
Widell v. Wolf
was a fairly typical customer-broker dispute, in which
each party gave the arbitrators a different factual version of certain key
events. The customer claimed that the broker had made unauthorized
trades in his account despite instructions to stop. 232 The broker argued
that the customer should be barred from recovery because he failed to
protest promptly after receiving regular account statements. 233 The cus226. Id. at 123.
227. Zate v. A.T. Brod & Co., 839 F. Supp. 27, 29-30 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
228. Id.
229. See POSER, supra note 28, at 387-88.
230. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Sherwin-Williams
Co., 71 F.3d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1678 (1996). Judicial impatience with groundless opposition to motions to compel arbitration or with groundless appeals from arbitrators' decisions, manifests itself not only in awards of attorneys' fees but
also in sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Such awards and
sanctions may be ordered against attorneys as well as against the parties themselves. See,
e.g., Fanning v. Bear Stearns & Co., No. 91C1461, 1991 WL 169057 (N.D. II1. Aug. 27,
1991); Robinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 15 (D. Mass. 1989). A Rule 11
sanction may take the form of an award of attorneys' fees. Robinson, 129 F.R.D. at 22.
231. 43 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 1994).
232. Id.
233. Id. For a discussion of the doctrine of ratification as it applies to unauthorized
trading, see POSER, supra note 28, at 432-35.
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tomer replied that the broker had told him the account statements were
erroneous and that he should discard them without even opening the envelopes. Evidently believing the customer's version, the arbitrators
awarded him $57,500.234
The broker moved the district court to set aside the award, on "public
policy" grounds, asserting that the customer had an obligation to read his
account statements and point out errors quickly. 235 When the district
court dismissed the broker's claim, he appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
which affirmed, ruling that the public policy argument was a "thinly disguised attempt to reargue the merits of the claim ' 236 and citing the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitral awards. 2 37 The court also ordered
the broker to show cause why he should not be directed to pay the legal
fees and expenses reasonably incurred in defense of the appeal, as a sanction for taking a frivolous appeal.238 The court explained:
Arbitration is supposed to permit quick and cheap decision. Litigation like this defeats that purpose. We have remarked before that
awards of attorneys' fees are readily available when one side refuses
to accept an arbitrator's award and loses-for the American Rule
requires each side to pay its fees in the first round of litigation but
does not compel it to pay for a second round attacking the outcome
239
of the first.
In a similar case, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorneys' fees and double
the amount of its costs and attorneys' fees in both the district court and
the appellate court to an investor, where the defeated brokerage firm
presented meritless opposition to an award, stating that "[t]here is no reason that the cost of this prolonged and frivolous resistance should be im'240
posed upon [the investor].
Attorneys' fees may also be awarded against a party who litigates the
issue of arbitrability, or simply attempts to use the courts to avoid arbitration, without a reasonable basis.2 41 In Fransen v. Terps Limited Liability
Co.,242 the plaintiff brought an action in federal district court under federal and state securities laws. The defendant moved for a stay pending
234. Widel, 43 F.3d at 1150.
235. Id. at 1151.
236. Id.
237. In general, a court may vacate or modify an arbitral award only in cases of corruption or misconduct, or where the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
Most federal circuits permit the vacation of an award where the arbitrators acted in manifest disregard of the law. See Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990).
238. Widell, 43 F.3d at 1151-52. It is not clear whether the court meant to include only
the expenses of defending the appeal from the district court's dismissal of the broker's
move to vacate the award, or also the expenses of defending the motion to vacate.
239. Id.
240. Rostad & Rostad Corp. v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 923 F.2d
694, 697 (9th Cir. 1991). See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kalin, No. 94C7243, 1995
WL 340945, at *2 (N.D. I11.June 2, 1995) ("By asking for district court review of disappointing arbitration awards, disgruntled litigants may be compounding, rather than ameliorating their troubles.").
241. R.M. Perez & Assocs. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1992).
242. 153 F.R.D. 655 (D. Colo. 1994).
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arbitration on the ground that the action was substantially the same as
one filed by the plaintiff in state court, where the court had ordered arbitration. The federal court granted the stay, holding that the state court's
order had preclusive effect. 243 The defendants moved for attorneys' fees,
arguing that the plaintiff's complaint was without factual or legal basis
244
and was simply an attempt to circumvent the state court's judgment.
The federal court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's attorneys'
fees for this "blatant example of forum shopping." 245 The court based its
order not on the "bad faith" exception to the American Rule, but on a
Colorado statute that requires a trial court to "award attorneys' fees if it
finds that the prosecution or defense of an action, either in whole or in
part, lacked substantial justification. '246 The court stated:
[Under the statute, a] claim is substantially groundless if the complaint contains allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, but the allegations are not supported by
any credible evidence. Presumably, this statute applies to state law
247
claims heard in federal court.
Furthermore, attorneys who engage in meritless proceedings on behalf of
their clients in an attempt to avoid arbitration or to avoid confirmation of
arbitration awards have themselves been ordered to pay the opposing
248
side's attorneys' fees.
Not all attempts to avoid (or compel) arbitration or to obtain review of
arbitrators' awards lack justification. Since the question whether a dispute is arbitrable is usually for the court, not the arbitrators, to decide, 249
a party who litigates this question and loses should not be liable for attorneys' fees if his arguments have merit. O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty &
Co. 2 50 involved a three-way relationship between a customer, the "introducing firm" that handled her account, and the "clearing firm" that carried her brokerage account on its books. 251 The customer brought suit
against the introducing brokerage firm that handled her brokerage account and its registered representative. The introducing firm moved to
compel arbitration on the ground that it was a third-party beneficiary of
the agreement between the plaintiff and the clearing firm, although the
plaintiff had signed an arbitration agreement only with the clearing
firm. 252 The district court dismissed some of the plaintiffs claims and
243. See id. at 657.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 660.
246. Id. at 657-58 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101).
247. Id. at 658 (citation omitted).
248. See, e.g., First Investors Corp. v. American Capital Fin. Servs., 823 F.2d 307, 310
(9th Cir. 1987) (client and counsel are jointly and severally liable for double costs and
attorneys' fees); Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 708 (2d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1067 (1986).
249. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (1995).
250. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
251. For a discussion of the legal duties of introducing and clearing firms, see POSER,
supra note 28, at 178-85.
252. O'Connor,965 F.2d. at 900-01.
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ordered arbitration of the remaining claims.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision on the arbitration
question, holding that an introducing broker cannot enforce an arbitration agreement between an investor and a clearing broker as a third-party
beneficiary. 25 3 The plaintiff requested an award of attorneys' fees, claiming, first, that the introducing firm had moved to compel arbitration on
the basis of an agreement to which it was not a party and, second, that the
defendants had ignored established law concerning waiver of arbitration
which would have precluded its right to arbitration even if it had been a
party to the agreement. In denying attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, the
court emphasized that the defendants' position, though unsuccessful, was
not without some merit:
A split of authority exists as to whether an introducing broker can
enforce an arbitration agreement between an investor and clearing
broker as a third party beneficiary. Defendants therefore had a reasonable basis upon which to bring their motion to compel arbitration. We hold the motion to compel arbitration was not brought in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. Second,
although we did not reach the question of waiver, the Defendants
persuaded the district court they did not waive their right to arbitration. We refuse to conclude the Defendants' alleged waiver
was so
2 54
obvious that to pursue it subjects defendants to sanctions.
Similarly, not all unsuccessful attempts to vacate arbitrators' decisions
justify the award of attorneys' fees. In French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,255 an arbitration panel awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages, interest, and consequential damages. Merrill moved
to vacate, contesting the arbitrability of the consequential damages and
interest claims. The district court confirmed the award of compensatory
damages and interest, but vacated the award of consequential damages as
beyond the scope of the matter submitted for arbitration. French appealed the order to vacate, and Merrill cross-appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the confirmation of the award of interest and reinstated the
award of consequential damages. 256 The appellate court denied the
plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees, stating that "[t]hough ultimately unpersuasive, Merrill Lynch's argument that the interest award should have
been vacated or modified was not 'frivolous.'. . . [A]n appeal is frivolous
only 'if the result is obvious, or the arguments of error are wholly without
merit.' ' 257 The court further suggested that an appeal from an arbitrator's decision that is of questionable rationality is not frivolous, even
though the court confirms the decision because it is not "completely
258
irrational.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
784 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 907-09.
Id. at 909.
Id.

320
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A challenge to an arbitration award will not justify an award of attorneys' fees if it is based on existing law and is not interposed merely for
delay, 259 or if the issue raised by the moving party "is a case of first impression with decent arguments on each side. '260 In one unusual case, a
district court even refused to award attorneys' fees against a disappointed
investor who made meritless arguments in attempting to vacate an arbitral award because the court concluded that he raised them in good
faith.2 6 1 The court pointed out that the investor, though a former attorney, was an inactive member of the bar and appeared pro se in the action.
"The court also considers that his arguments were made in response to
petitioners [sic] motion to confirm and the costs petitioner incurred were
largely of its own making in seeking the aid of the court in enforcing the

arbitration award."2 62 This investor must have made a very favorable impression on the court.

D.

CHOICE OF FORUM AND VENUE

Controversies over choice of forum have generated considerable litigation. Much of this litigation has involved the efforts of customers to
bring their claims before an arbitration panel of the American Arbitration Association and the efforts of brokerage firms to restrict customers
to an SRO forum.26 3 Although the SEC staff has informally supported
the inclusion of the AAA as a choice in arbitration agreements, the Com-

mission does not require firms to offer this choice to their customers.264
As a result, the arbitration clauses of most large firms restrict the choice
of forum to two or three SROs. 265 Many investors prefer the AAA, de-

spite its higher fees, because it gives the parties more opportunity to select the arbitrators and because of investors' perception that the SRO
forums, although supervised by the SEC, are controlled by the securities

industry, or as one financial journalist put it, "by the very folks whom
259. FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 811 F. Supp. 439, 446 (D. Minn. 1993), affd, 14 F.3d 1310
(8th Cir. 1994); see also Schmidt v. Finberg, 942 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991).
260. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Sherwin-Williams
Co., 71 F.3d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1678 (1996).
261. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
262. Id. at 220.
263. Susan Antilla, At the Bar: Brokerage Firms Steer Dissatisfied Customers Away
from Court, But in Only One Direction, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1995, at A29.
264. A state statute that invalidates any arbitration agreement that does not provide for
arbitration before the AAA or another "independent nonindustry arbitration forum" has
been held to be invalid, on the ground that it comes into clear conflict with the FAA and
thus violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Lewis, 751 F. Supp. 205, 208 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (invalidating Florida statute). Such a restriction also violates Section 5 of the FAA, which provides that "[i]f in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an
umpire, such method shall be followed .. " Id.
265. Of ten brokerage firms surveyed by the New York Times in 1994, only two included the AAA in arbitration clauses in their customer agreements. Antilla, supra note
263, at A29. In 1994, 274 securities arbitrations were filed with the AAA, whereas 5570
were filed with the NASD. George H. Friedman & Florence M. Peterson, Investors'
Choice of ADR Forums May Be Limited, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at B15.
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they are accusing of cheating. 2' 66
The arbitration clause in a typical standard-form customer's agreement
used by a brokerage firm allows the customer to choose from among two
or more arbitration forums. 267 The question of interpreting choice-of-forum clauses in agreements covered by the FAA is governed by federal
law. 268 The Second Circuit has held that a contractual provision that requires the parties to arbitrate "in accordance" with the provisions of the
NYSE Constitution and NYSE rules is not simply a choice-of-law provi269
sion but an exclusive selection of a forum.
Firms that are members of more than one SRO are no longer permitted
2 70
to use exclusive choice-of-forum clauses. In Roney & Co. v. Goren,
the Sixth Circuit enforced an arbitration agreement that limited the customer to a single forum, that of the NYSE, but the court conceded that
the SEC had the authority, as the regulator of the SROs, to require multiple forums. 27 1 Less than three months after the Roney decision, the SEC
exercised its authority by publishing an opinion of its General Counsel
stating:
Member[s] of the NYSE, NASD, AMEX or CBOE will not be permitted to limit customers to a single arbitration forum if any SRO to
which the member belongs has a conflicting arbitration rule, such as
the NASD rule at issue in Roney, giving the272customer the choice to
submit a claim for arbitration to that SRO.
The SEC explained that giving the customer a choice among SRO forums
is mandated by the SRO rule that prohibits a member firm to make an
agreement with a customer that limits or contradicts an SRO rule. 273 A
firm that is a member of both the NASD and the NYSE is not permitted
to restrict a customer's choice of forum to the NYSE because such a restriction would contradict the NASD rule that makes an NASD arbitration forum available to customers of NASD member firms. 274 Under the
terms of the SEC release, however, a brokerage firm that is a member of
the NASD, but of no other SRO, may limit its customers to the NASD
arbitration forum.
Customers' usual preference for the AAA forum has led to the development of various legal strategies for accomplishing this end, even
though the brokerage firm's standard-form customer agreement does not
266. Id.
267. Having once chosen the forum, the customer is bound by his choice. Clark v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 636 F. Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
268. Weiner v. Gutfreund, 68 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 1995).
269. Id. at 558-59. Some New York courts have read similar clauses as mere choice-oflaw provisions. Id.
270. 875 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1989).
271. Id. at 1221.
272. SEC Litigation Release No. 12198, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,437, at 80,378 (Aug. 7, 1989).
273. NYSE Rule 637; NASD Rule IM-3110(f)(4). The rule was adopted in 1989 at the
behest of the SEC.
274. SEC Litigation Release No. 12198, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,437, at 80,377 (Aug. 7, 1989).
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expressly offer the AAA as a choice of forum. The chief such strategy,
which can be used if the firm is a member of the American Stock Exchange (Amex), is to invoke the so-called "Amex Window." The Amex
Window is a provision in the Amex Constitution that states:
Sec.2 Arbitration shall be conducted under the arbitration procedures of this Exchange, except as follows:
(c) if any of the parties to a controversy is a customer, the customer may elect to arbitrate before the American Arbitration Association in the City of New York, unless the customer has expressly
to submit only to the arbitration procedure of the
agreed, in writing,
275
Exchange.
Two questions have arisen with respect to the Amex Window: (1)
whether an arbitration agreement between a customer and a member
firm of the Amex permits the customer to arbitrate before the AAA even
though the agreement does not specifically mention the AAA as a forum
choice; and (2) whether the phrase "in the City of New York" in the
quoted language of the Amex Constitution is a venue provision that requires that the AAA arbitration be held in New York City, or whether
the phrase is simply a way of identifying the location of the headquarters
of the AAA.
In general, customers have had little success in using the Amex Window to gain access to the AAA forum. The leading case is Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Georgiadis,276 where the arbitration clause
of the options agreement entered into between the customer and the firm
provided: "Any controversy . . . shall be settled by arbitration only
before the [NASD] or the [NYSE], or an Exchange located in the United
States upon which listed options transactions are executed. '277 The customer contended that, because the Amex was one of the exchanges referred to in the arbitration agreement (listed options are traded on the
Amex), the Amex Window gave him the right to have his claims arbitrated before the AAA. In rejecting this argument the Second Circuit
held that the arbitration provision of the Amex Constitution may be superseded by a more specific customer agreement, and that the parties had
closed the Amex Window by agreement. 278 Citing U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that instructed the courts to "rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate," the court held that a customer agreement2 79can validly modify
the arbitration provision of the Amex Constitution.
275. AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE CONST., art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in Am. Stock Ex.
Guide (CCH) 9063 (1989).
276. 903 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1990).
277. Id. at 111. The agreement clearly permitted arbitration at the Amex, where listed
options were traded.
278. Id. at 113.

279. Id. at 112-13 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226

(1987), and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). The court

distinguished SEC Litigation Release No. 12198 [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 84,437 (Aug. 7, 1989), on the ground that in that release the SEC had prohibited
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Georgiadis involved an arbitration clause that gave the customer a
choice of having his claims heard "before" certain SROs. In Cowen &
Co. v. Anderson,280 the customer signed a margin agreement and an option agreement, both of which gave him the choice of having his claims
heard in "accordance with the rules, then in effect" of the NYSE, NASD,
or Amex.28 The New York Court of Appeals found that the "plain language" and "clear meaning" of the agreements permitted the customer to
arbitrate before the AAA, because the Amex Constitution defined the
term "rules of the Exchange" to encompass the exchange's Constitution
(including its Amex Window provision). 282 Resting its decision "upon
settled rules of contract law," the court distinguished Georgiadis on the
basis of the different language of the agreements in the two cases and
stated that the agreements in Cowen "do not expressly state that [the
customer] is bound to arbitrate [his] claim 'only before' the three selfregulatory organizations or that the customer must submit to arbitration
in accordance with the procedures of a particular entity. '283
Most of the decisions, however, refuse access to the AAA through the
Amex Window, reasoning that unless the AAA is specifically mentioned
in the arbitration agreement the parties have not demonstrated a manifest intent to include the AAA as a forum choice. Access to the AAA
through the Amex Window has been denied even where, as in Cowen, the
language of the agreement permitted the customer to arbitrate under the
rules of the Amex (as opposed to before the Amex). In Luckie v. Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co.,284 the agreements signed by different customers contained both kinds of language: some of the plaintiffs had
agreed to arbitrate disputes in accordance with the rules of the Amex,
while others had agreed to arbitrate before the Amex. The Eleventh
Circuit held that, under either kind of language, the parties had "closed
the AMEX Window by agreement" because they had not expressly
agreed to submit disputes to arbitration before the AAA. 285 Other
courts have held that the Amex Window is a default provision that applies only in the absence of a specific agreement and that the Amex Window is superseded by any arbitration clause that does not include the
arbitration agreements that limit customers to a single SRO arbitration forum, which the
agreement in Georgiadis did not do. Georgiadis, 903 F.2d at 113.
280. 558 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1990).
281. Id. at 28 (emphasis supplied).
282. Id. at 28-29. The court stated that even if the language of the agreements could be
considered ambiguous, the court would construe the language against the brokerage firm
because the firm drafted the agreements. Id. at 29; see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995) (Brokerage firm that drafted customer's agreement "could not overcome the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court
should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted it."); see
also Mueske v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 859 P.2d 444, 449-50 (Mont. 1993) ("Uncertain terms in a contract are to be construed against the party causing the uncertainty.").
283. Cowen, 558 N.E.2d at 29.
284. 999 F.2d 509 (11th Cir. 1993).
285. Id. at 513-14.
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AAA as an available forum.2 86 Still other courts have held that the word
"rules" in an arbitration agreement that enabled the customer to have his
claims arbitrated "in accordance with the rules ... of ...the [NYSE,
Amex, or NASD]" referred to the arbitration procedures of the three
SROs, not to their constitutions or other general provisions for resolving
2 87
disputes.
Where an arbitration agreement contains a clause providing for the locus of the arbitration, a district court is required by Section 4 of the FAA
to "make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. '288 The Seventh Circuit held
in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Lauer289 that the district
court has authority to enforce a situs-selection clause, regardless of
whether the agreement actually specifies the hearing site or whether it
2 90
specifies the arbitration forum and the forum selects the site.
In those cases where the claimant has succeeded in gaining access to
the AAA through the Amex Window, the courts are in disagreement as
to whether the term "in the City of New York" in the Amex Window
provision is a venue provision or simply a way of describing the location
of the principal office of the AAA. If it is the former, a claimant using
the Amex Window is required to arbitrate his case in New York City. In
Bear, Stearns & Co. v. Bennett,2 9 1 the customer filed a Demand for Arbitration against a brokerage firm with the AAA pursuant to the Amex
Window and sought arbitration in Naples, Florida. The brokerage firm
filed a petition in federal court in New York to compel arbitration in New
York City. The Second Circuit held, first, that forum-selection clauses in
arbitration agreements are valid292 and, second, that the term "in the City
of New York" as used in the Amex Window provision is a forum-selection clause. 293 Thus, since the agreement specified New York City as the
situs for the hearing, neither the AAA nor the arbitrators had authority
to determine the situs.2 94 On the other hand, the Florida Circuit Court
has held that the term "in the City of New York" as used in the Amex
286. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. King, 804 F. Supp. 1512,
1514 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
287. PaineWebber Inc. v. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd sub. nom.
PaineWebber Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Prudential Sec., Inc.
v. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 764, 765-66 (W.D. Tenn. 1992) (access to AAA arbitration facilities available to customer who agreed to arbitrate "in accordance with the rules" of the
Amex).
288. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
289. 49 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1995).
290. Id. at 330.
291. 938 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
292. Id. at 32 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)).
293. Id. (citing PaineWebber Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1990));
see also PaineWebber Inc. v. Pitchford, 721 F. Supp. 542, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd sub
nom PaineWebber Inc. v. Rutherford, 903 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1990) (It is clear and unequivocal that the phrase "in the City of New York" is a venue provision. "The Claimants [sic]
argument that this phrase is merely intended to state the AAA's headquarters is ...unpersuasive and unavailing.").
294. Bennett, 938 F.2d at 32.
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Window is not a situs-selection clause, but merely describes the location
295
of the AAA's main office.
Forum selection is one area where, despite the supposed economy of
arbitration, brokerage firms are able to embroil customer claimants in
protracted litigation. In the Lauer case, the Lauers, who presumably had
been residents of Illinois when they opened their brokerage account, filed
an arbitration claim with the NASD, as permitted by the arbitration
agreement, and requested a hearing in Florida, where they had relocated.
Merrill Lynch requested an Illinois arbitration site. The NASD selected
Tampa, Florida and set a date for the hearing, and both sides began prehearing discovery. Meanwhile, Merrill Lynch filed an action in federal
court in Illinois to compel arbitration there. The Lauers opposed Merrill
Lynch's motion and filed their own claim in federal court in Florida to
compel arbitration in that state, where the NASD had ruled that the arbitration was to proceed. 296 The Illinois district court ruled in Merrill
2 97
Lynch's favor, and the Lauers appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
Merrill Lynch's litigation tactics were designed to shift the arbitration
hearing to a jurisdiction within the Seventh Circuit, where federal law
required the court to withdraw the issues of punitive damages and the
NASD eligibility rule from the arbitrators. The Seventh Circuit stated:
"The 'whys' of all this forum 298 shopping are self-evident: If the Northern District of Illinois decides arbitrability, the Lauers lose a chunk of
their claims; if the decision rests with the Northern District of Florida,
both punitive damages and potentially stale claims may go to the arbitrator for resolution. '2 99 The court held that, under Section 4 of the
FAA, 300 only the district court in the forum selected by the parties can
issue an order compelling arbitration. 30 1 Because the parties had selected
a Florida hearing site (they had selected NASD arbitration, and the
NASD, pursuant to its own rules, had selected Florida), both the language of the statute and the interests of judicial economy gave the Florida district court the authority to hear the Lauers' claim and any defenses
295. Joseph v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. C190-7284, 1991 WL 370135, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. May 1, 1991).
296. Lauer, 49 F.3d 323, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1995).
297. Id. at 326.
298. The court used the word "forum" to denote both the organization providing arbitration facilities and the location of the hearing. To avoid any confusion, "forum" is used
here to mean the organization, while "site," "situs," or "venue" is used to mean the hearing
location.
299. Lauer, 49 F.3d at 326.
300. Section 4 provides, in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction
under Title 28 ...for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement .... The hearing and proceedings,
under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an
order directing such arbitration is filed.
Id. at 327 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
301. Lauer, 49 F.3d at 327.
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or counterclaims that Merrill Lynch might offer. Dismissal of the Illinois
suit avoided parallel proceedings and promoted the conservation of judicial resources. 30 2 Nevertheless, the Lauers were required to litigate in
two different jurisdictions, on the trial and appellate levels, before they

were able to obtain a hearing on the merits of their claims. Whether or
not one of Merrill Lynch's purposes in initiating the Illinois litigation was
to add greatly to the Lauers' litigation expenses and perhaps to discour-

age them from pursuing their claim, this was undoubtedly an effect of its
strategy.
Finally, in keeping with the overriding goal of the FAA that arbitration
agreements should be enforced to the same extent as any other contract,

in accordance with the intention of the parties, it has been held that forum-selection clauses can have retroactive effect if the court finds that the
parties so intended. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Prouse,303 the customers and the brokerage firm signed a customer's agreement in 1983
that included an arbitration clause permitting the customers to choose
from among several forums, including the AAA. In 1987, they signed a
new agreement that did not include the AAA as a forum. The court held
that the new agreement superseded the old one, even as to transactions
that occurred before the signing of the 1987 agreement. The court also
rejected the customers' argument that because three other claimants
planned to exercise their contractual right to arbitrate their claims before

the AAA, concerns for judicial economy and the specter of inconsistent
judgments should incline it toward compelling the brokerage firm to arbi-

trate the customers' claims before the AAA: "[T]he intent of the [FAA]
is to enforce private arbitration agreements even at the expense of complex and inefficient dispute resolution, and consequently, we lack the
power to consolidate respondents' arbitrations before the AAA in New
York City absent an agreement among all the parties authorizing us to do
so." ' 30 4

Furthermore, a party can, by its conduct, waive its contractual
right to enforce a forum-selection clause, just as it can waive its right to
302. Id. at 330. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McLeod, 622 N.Y.S.2d
954 (App. Div. 1995), a Florida resident brought an NYSE arbitration claim by writing to
the NYSE's office in New York, requesting arbitration in Florida. The NYSE assigned the
claim for arbitration in Florida. Merrill Lynch brought an action in a New York state court
to stay the arbitration, and the claimant moved to stay the court proceeding on grounds of
inconvenience and lack of personal jurisdiction over him in New York. The New York
appellate court held that the customer had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the New
York courts by sending her request to arbitrate in Florida to the NYSE "whose designated
office for correspondence happened to be located in New York." Id. at 956. The court also
stated:
In the last analysis, if Merrill Lynch, through its Florida brokerage office, had
been so determined to force this Florida client to arbitrate claims in New
York, it could easily have provided as much, explicitly, in the customer agreement. Thus, not only contractual principles but also fairness and due process
require this proceeding to be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
Id.
303. 831 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
304. Id. at 331, 332 n.5 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218-21
(1985)).
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enforce an agreement to arbitrate. 30 5
V.

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ARBITRABILITY

As a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), arbitration should
be conceived as being separate from and independent of the judicial system. The arbitrability of a dispute is based on the contractual agreement
between the parties, not upon legal rules. The parties' agreement determines the scope of the agreement to arbitrate and the rules and procedures under which the dispute will be resolved. 3°6 Once a trial court has
ordered a pending case to be submitted to arbitration, the following
occurs:
[T]he action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the
trial court retaining merely vestigial jurisdiction ....
During that
time ... , a court may appoint arbitrators if the method selected by
the parties fails; grant a provisional remedy..., and confirm, correct
or vacate the arbitration award ....
Absent an agreement to withdraw the controversy from arbitration, however, no other judicial act
is authorized .... In the interim, the arbitrator takes over. It is the
job of the arbitrator, not the307court, to resolve all questions needed to
determine the controversy.
The existence of an abundance of arbitration-related litigation makes it
clear, however, that arbitration in practice does not even approach being
a completely independent system of dispute resolution. To some degree
arbitrators are necessarily controlled by the courts. It is not my contention that arbitrators should be entirely free of judicial control. The FAA
wisely requires the courts to determine the arbitrability of disputes, since
parties cannot and should not be required to arbitrate unless they have
agreed to do so, and to vacate arbitral awards if the arbitrators have been
guilty of misconduct or have exceeded their powers. Nevertheless, despite the courts' frequent statements that there is a strong federal policy
favoring arbitration, they have too frequently been willing to decide issues that are more properly for the arbitrators to decide.
Under the FAA, arbitration and the judicial system intersect at two
points: first, the initial determination of arbitrability; and second, judicial
review. 30 8 If the issue of arbitrability is raised in a court proceeding, the
court 30 9 must temporarily stay the proceeding in order to conduct a lim305. Wall Street Assocs. v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 27 F.3d 845, 850 (2d Cir. 1994) (by
joining a co-defendant's motion to compel arbitration without taking exception to any of
the fora listed in the motion, defendant obligated itself to arbitrate in any forum to which
the motion applied).
306. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
307. TitanNalue Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 4, 7 (Ct. App.
1994) (citations omitted).
308. The court's power to vacate or modify an arbitration award if the arbitrators exceeded their powers, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4), also raises the issue of arbitrability.
309. "Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a suit 'in any of the courts of the United
States,' the state courts have almost unanimously recognized that the stay provision of § 3
applies to suits in state as well as federal courts .. " Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.34 (1983).
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ited inquiry to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties and whether the specific dispute falls within the scope
of that agreement. 310 The threshold question of arbitrability is for the
court, not the arbitrators, to decide, unless the parties agreed to submit

the arbitrability question itself to arbitration. 311 On the question of arbi-

trability, the usual presumption in favor of submitting issues to the arbi-

trators is reversed, the presumption being that (1) the court will decide
the question of arbitrability; and (2) the court should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate the question unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so. 3 12 If the court decides the arbitrability

question, its inquiry will consist of a four-step analysis, in which it will
determine the following: (1) whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate;
(2) the scope of the agreement; (3) whether Congress intended the claims
remaining nonarbitrable
to be arbitrable; and (4) whether trial of any
31 3
claims should be stayed pending arbitration.
If the court, 314 after holding a hearing (with the right to a jury trial) on
the issue of arbitrability, is satisfied that the dispute falls within the scope
of a valid arbitration agreement, it is required to "make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
310. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994).
311. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923-24 (1995); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
312. Kaplan, 115 S.Ct. at 1924. A court may have to decide whether the parties agreed
that the arbitrators will decide the question of arbitrability.
313. Holloway v. Gruntal & Co., Inc., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,361, at 95,863 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1993). According to the New York arbitration law,
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R., art. 75, there are three "threshold questions" that a court must
resolve on a motion to stay or to compel arbitration: "[W]hether the parties made a valid
agreement to arbitrate, whether if such an agreement was made it has been complied with,
and whether the claim sought to be arbitrated would be barred by limitation of time had it
been asserted in a court of the State." County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., Inc.,
409 N.E.2d 951, 953 (N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted).
314. It is not entirely clear whether §8 3 and 4 require a state court as well as a federal
court to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. "Although § 3 refers ambiguously to a
suit 'in any of the courts of the United States,' the state courts have almost unanimously
recognized that the stay provision of § 3 applies to suits in state as well as federal
courts.... ." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 27 n.34. But in Volt Info. Sciences, the Supreme Court suggested that these procedural sections of the FAA were not
applicable in state courts:
While we have held that the FAA's "substantive" provisions-§§ 1 and 2are applicable in state as well as federal court ...,we have never held that
§§ 3 and 4, which by their terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court, see 9 U.S.C. § 3 (referring to proceedings "brought in any of the
courts of the United States"); § 4 (referring to "any United States district
court"), are nonetheless applicable in state court.
Volt Info Sciences, Inc., 489 U.S. at 477 n.6 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, prior to deciding Volt Info. Sciences the California Court of Appeals held that § 4 requires state courts to
compel arbitration. More recently, the same court cited Volt Info. Sciences for the rule that
"the procedural provisions of [§§] 3 and 4 ...only apply, by their express terms, to proceedings in federal court, and have not been held applicable in state courts." Strauch v.
Eyring, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 747, 749 (Ct. App. 1994). The California Court of Appeals concluded that, because § 4 does not apply in state court proceedings, the provision of § 4
assuring the right to a jury trial on the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement is
not applicable. Id.
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of the agreement. '3 15 The court's power to order arbitration is not limited to a situation where one party refuses to arbitrate; it extends to a
party whose grievance is the other party's failure to arbitrate under the
terms of the agreement, as, for example, where a party refuses to arbi3 16
trate in the arbitral forum or location named in the agreement.
The FAA does not define the term "arbitrability." Thus, arbitability is
as broad or narrow as the number of issues that can be formulated within
its terms. Whether the court or the arbitrators should decide the question
of the applicability of the NASD eligibility rule, the authority of arbitrators to award punitive damages or attorneys' fees, or questions of forum
and venue, depends largely on whether or not these issues are viewed as
issues of arbitrability. If they are arbitrability questions, they should presumptively be decided by the court, not the arbitrators. Thus, the more
broadly arbitrability is defined, the more arbitration-related litigation is
likely to occur.
Arbitrability can mean several different things. A party may argue that
a particular dispute is not arbitrable because there was no agreement to
arbitrate; because, although there was an agreement to arbitrate, it did
not cover the subject matter of the dispute; or because, although an
agreement covered the dispute, the party denying arbitrability did not
execute the agreement. All these are clearly questions of arbitrability,
which the FAA contemplates will be decided by the court. To allow arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction would put the cart before the
horse, by assuming the answer to the very question that is being posed.
Extending the scope of arbitrability questions beyond these threshold
issues circumscribes the discretion allowed to the arbitrators and thereby
reduces or destroys the usefulness of arbitration. For example, if the
rules of an arbitral forum require that a statement of claim specify the
relevant facts and the remedies sought, it would be both absurd and destructive to say that the question whether a statement of claim complies
with this requirement is a question of arbitrability and therefore for the
court to decide. 31 7 Yet to hold, as five circuit courts do, that the SRO
eligibility rule raises a question of arbitrability is not much less absurd or
much less destructive.
The federal courts are divided on the meaning of arbitrability. On the
eligibility question, there not only is a split of authority but the courts
differ on their rationale for coming to the same conclusion. 318 It may
seem surprising, therefore, that over thirty years ago the Supreme Court
provided a carefully reasoned analysis of the question of which issues
should be decided by the courts and which by the arbitrators. In John
315. 9 U.S.C. § 4; Volt Info. Sciences, 489 U.S. at 474-75; Houlihan, 31 F.3d at 695;
Kyung In Lee v. Pacific Bullion (New York) Inc., 788 F. Supp. 155, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
316. Lauer, 49 F.3d at 327.
317. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barchman, 916 F. Supp. 845,849
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 96-113.
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Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,31 9 the question before the Court was
whether the court or the arbitrator should decide whether procedural
prerequisites in a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause had been met. 320 The union sought to arbitrate certain grievances that it and its members had against the company, whereas the
company took the position that the grievances did not fall within the
scope of the arbitration clause. 321 The company argued that the collective bargaining agreement contained
procedural conditions to arbitration,
322
which the union had not met.
Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the dispute,
including the question of whether the procedural conditions had been
met, should be submitted to the arbitrator. 32 3 The Court's reasoning is
so relevant to the questions raised in arbitration-related litigation in securities cases that it is worth quoting at some length:
We think that labor disputes of the kind involved here cannot be
broken down so easily into their 'substantive' and 'procedural' aspects. Questions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an
actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those
covered by it.
Doubt whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to
a particular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or
excused, or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the
duty to arbitrate cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration of the merits of the dispute which is presented for arbitration ....
It would be a curious rule which required that intertwined
issues of 'substance' and 'procedure' growing out of a single dispute
and raising the same questions on the same facts had to be carved up
between two different forums, one deciding after the other. Neither
logic nor considerations of policy compel such a result.
Once it is determined, as we have, that the parties are obligated to
submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration,'procedural'questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition
should be left to the arbitrator. Even under a contrary rule, a court
could deny arbitration only if it could confidently be said not only
that a claim was strictly 'procedural,' and therefore within the purview of the court, but also that it should operate to bar arbitration
altogether, and not merely limit or qualify an arbitral award. In
319. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
320. Id. at 544. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the petitioner, was the successor to a company
that had signed the collective bargaining agreement. The Court held that Wiley was bound
by its predecessor's obligation to arbitrate under the bargaining agreement. Id. at 550-51.
321. The union's grievances related to such matters as seniority rights, contributions by
the company to a pension plan, severance pay, and vacation pay. Id. at 552.
322. The agreement provided for arbitration as the third step of the grievance procedure. Step 1 called for a conference between the affected employee and a representative
of the employer, and Step 2 called for a conference between representatives of the employer and the union. Id. at 555-56.
323. Id. at 558-59.
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view of the policies favoring arbitration and the parties' adoption of
arbitration as the preferred means of settling disputes, such cases are
likely to be rare indeed. In all other cases, those in which arbitration
goes forward, the arbitrator would ordinarily remain free to reconsider the ground covered by the court insofar as it bore on the merits
of the dispute, using the flexible approaches familiar to arbitration.
Reservation of 'procedural' issues for the courts would thus not only
create the difficult task of separating related issues, but would also
produce frequent duplication of effort.
In addition, the opportunities for deliberate delay and the possibility of well-intentioned but no less serious delay created by separation
of the 'procedural' and 'substantive' elements of a dispute are
clear. . . . [S]uch delay may entirely eliminate the prospect of a
speedy arbitrated settlement of the dispute....
No justification for such a generally undesirable result is to be
found in a presumed intention of the parties. Refusal to order arbitration of subjects which the parties have not agreed to arbitrate
does not entail the fractionating of 324
disputes about subjects which the
parties do wish to have submitted.
Although John Wiley arose in the context of a labor dispute, its reasoning with respect to the question of arbitrability is readily applicable to
securities cases. In fact, Justice Harlan's opinion considers most of the
major issues which are discussed in this Article: the federal legislative
and judicial policy favoring arbitration; 32 5 the importance of implementing the contractual intentions of the parties;326 the futility of attempting
to distinguish "procedural" from "substantive" issues involved in the
same controversy; 327 the inefficiency of having separate proceedings to
decide intertwined questions; 328 and the opportunities for intentional or
unintentional delay that would be created by such separate
329
proceedings.
The John Wiley Court's statement that, once it is determined that the
parties have agreed to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, procedural questions bearing on its final disposition should be left to
the arbitrator, seems at least to suggest that the applicability of the SRO
eligibility rules is a question for the arbitrators to decide. 330 Yet, curiously, the decisions that take the opposite position do not attempt to distinguish or otherwise deal with John Wiley's strong arguments. Instead,
they either ignore John Wiley entirely or cite it only for its statement of
the general proposition that whether or not a party is bound to arbitrate
is a matter to be determined by the court on the basis of the contract
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 556-58 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 551 n.4.
Id. at 556-59.
Id.
Id. at 555.
See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
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331

between the parties.
A notable exception is the recent district court decision in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Barchman.332 Merrill Lynch, which
had been named as a respondent in a securities arbitration asked the
court to rule that certain claims were barred by the NYSE eligibility rule;
to order the claimants to resubmit their consolidated claims as individual
claims; and to order the claimants to amend their Statement of Claim in
order to comply with the NYSE Rule requiring specificity. 333 The district
court found John Wiley highly relevant to the determination of these
questions:
Although courts do resolve the threshold questions of whether a
valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate particular issues, both such resolutions being
based on the terms of the written arbitration agreement .... the seminal case of John Wiley ...makes it clear that courts are not to reach
out and micromanage the procedural aspects of arbitration. ....334
It is inexplicable that John Wiley is cited only one time-and then
in passing-in all of the materials tendered by the parties. Claimants' failure to mention the case until almost the end of their final
submission is particularly perplexing because John Wiley and its
progeny ... provide strong support335for Claimants' positions on the
consolidation and specificity issues.
Following John Wiley, the district court held that the issue of consolidation of claims was for the arbitrators to decide. 336 But the court held that
Third Circuit precedent required the court, not the arbitrators, to decide
the eligibility issue. 337 On the question of the specificity of the Statement
of Claim, the court stated that "[v]irtually every case dealing with similar
issues has decided that fulfillment of a procedural prerequisite is an issue

for the arbitrator .

",338

In PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi,339 a case decided in July 1996, the First
340
Circuit squarely addressed the question of the meaning of arbitrability.
The court noted that the Supreme Court had on two previous occasions
addressed itself to the issue of whether the court or the arbitrators should
331. See, e.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1376 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing
John Wiley, 376 U.S. at 547).
332. 916 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. I1l
1996).
333. NYSE Rule 612 states in part: "The Statement of Claim shall specify the relevant
facts and the remedies sought." Id. at 849.
334. Id. at 848-49 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
335. Id. at 848-49 n.6.
336. Id. at 857.
337. Id. at 858. See supra text accompanying notes 97, 103-04.
338. Id. at 850. Nevertheless, the court stated that it was "essential that Claimants
provide enough detail to enable this Court to determine whether the asserted theories of
recovery originated within the six-year eligibility period .. " Id.
339. 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996).
340. The court declined to apply the reasoning of John Wiley to the eligibility issue,
although it conceded that the John Wiley precedent would justify its holding that the arbitrators and not the court had authority to apply the NASD eligibility rule. Id. at 601 n.12.
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decide whether a dispute is arbitrable. 34 1 In the first case, AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. ,342 the issue was
whether the subject matter of the underlying dispute was expressly made
nonarbitrable by the terms of the arbitration agreement. 34 3 In the second
case, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,344 the issue was whether
two individuals who had not signed an arbitration agreement in their personal capacities were bound by the agreement. 345 In each instance, the
Supreme Court held that the question before it was a question of arbitrability, and that questions of arbitrability
were presumptively for the
346
court, not the arbitrators, to decide.
The Elahi court reasoned that the two kinds of arbitrability in dispute
in AT&T and First Options established a presumptive limit on the scope
of the concept:
Thus, if the parties have (1) entered into a valid arbitration agreement.. ., and (2) the arbitration agreement covers the subject matter
of the underlying dispute between them . . ., then we will presume
that the parties have made a commitment to have an arbitrator decide all the remaining347issues necessary to reach a decision on the
merits of the dispute.
The court explained that this presumption concerning the definition of
arbitrability was separate from the presumption of AT&T and First Options and that the court will decided the arbitrability of a dispute as
follows:
The presumption that we now adopt (i.e., that issues other than (1)
the existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties and
(2) whether the subject matter of the underlying dispute is within the
scope of the arbitration clause are presumptively not "arbitrability"
issues) must not be confused with-and in no way diminishes-the
presumption ... that issues of arbitrability are normally to be decided by the courts, not arbitrators.
.. [W]here the parties have clearly agreed to arbitrate the subject
matter of the underlying dispute between them, as the parties have
here, it is unlikely that they intended other issues related to the dispute, such as the timeliness of the348submission of the claim, to affect
the "arbitrability" of the dispute.
Decisions such as Barchman and Elahi, which give a narrow meaning
to the scope of "arbitrability" issues, are supported by the rules of the
341. Id. at 594-95.
342. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
343. The specific question was whether, under the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement, the company's decision to lay off workers when it determined that a lack of
work existed was covered by the arbitration clause contained in the agreement. Id. at 646.
344. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
345. The arbitration agreement had been executed by a corporation wholly owned by
the two individuals. Id. at 1921.
346. Id. at 1925-26.
347. Elahi, 87 F.3d at 599.
348. Id. at 599-600.
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NASD, which, under the arbitration clauses that brokerage firms include

in their customer-broker agreements, govern the vast majority of securities arbitrations. These rules authorize the arbitrators to resolve most
issues relating to the arbitration. The Code of Arbitration Procedure
(CAP) provides:
The arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under this Code and to take appropri-

ate action to obtain compliance with any ruling by the arbitrator(s).

Such interpretations and actions to obtain compliance shall be final

and binding upon the parties.349
This general rule is supplemented by provisions of the CAP which give
the arbitrators express authority to decide particular procedural matters.
The arbitrators are authorized to make final decisions concerning the
35 1
consolidation of claims;350 to rule on requests to amend the pleadings;

to designate the time and place of the hearing; 352 to consider prehearing

discovery requests; 353 and to determine the materiality and relevance of
354
evidence.
NASD rules also provide: "No party shall, during the arbitration of

any matter, prosecute or commence any suit, action or proceeding against
any other party touching upon any of the matters referred to arbitration

pursuant to this Code. ' '355 The Ruder Report recommended that this rule

(formerly Section 6 of CAP) be clarified in order to reduce the amount of
arbitration-related litigation:
The Task Force recommends that the NASD clarify or amend Section 6 ...so that it clearly precludes a party who has entered into a
predispute arbitration agreement from seeking court intervention on
issues of procedural arbitrability, such as eligibility or statutes of limitations, until after the arbitration award has been entered, and that
it enforce the provision. This recommendation should go a long way
to litigate in court
to address investor criticisms that they are forced
3 56
in order to maintain their right to arbitrate.
349. NASD Rule 10324 (formerly § 35 of CAP). See Elahi, 87 F.3d at 601 (section 35
"strongly undercuts any argument that the parties intended the § 15 time bar to be an
arbitrability issue to be decided only by the courts"); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310,
1312-1313 (8th Cir. 1994) (held that the parties' agreement to have their dispute governed
by the NASD Code, including § 35, is a clear and unmistakable expression of their intent to
leave the question of arbitrability to the arbitrators). Accord PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bybyk,
81 F.3d 1193, 1202 (2d Cir. 1996). But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Cohen, 62 F.3d 381, 384 (11th Cir. 1995) (section 35 is not clear and unmistakable evidence
of the parties' intent to allow the arbitrator to determine the timeliness of the claim); Emil
Bukhman, Time Limits on Arbitrability of Securities Industry Disputes Under the Arbitration Rules of Self-Regulatory Organizations,61 BROOK. L. REV. 143, 171 (1995).
350. NASD Rule 10314(d)(3).
351. NASD Rule 10328(b).
352. NASD Rule 10315.
353. NASD Rule 10321. Unresolved discovery issues are decided by a single member
of arbitration panel appointed by the NASD Director of Arbitration. NASD Rule
10321(e).
354. NASD Rule 10323.
355. NASD Rule 10106.
356. RUDER REPORT, supra note 8, at 32 (footnotes omitted).

1996]

SECURITIES ARBITRATION

Where an investor and a brokerage firm agree to arbitrate any future
disputes under the NASD CAP, their agreement thus incorporates the
NASD rules requiring that the arbitrators will decide all questions that
might arise relating to the matters referred to arbitration and that the
parties will not resort to the courts for a ruling on all such questions during the pendency of the arbitration. 357 Where a party nevertheless initiates arbitration-related litigation before the arbitrators have entered their
award, the court is justified in refusing to decide the issue and referring it
to the arbitrators in order to promote both of the two fundamental federal policies concerning arbitration: to resolve any doubts about arbitrability in favor of arbitration; 358 and to enforce parties' agreements to
359
arbitrate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration-related litigation is an unfortunate anomaly. The purpose
of arbitration is to avoid litigation and to offer disputants an alternative
forum that is cheaper, faster, and more efficient than litigation in court.
Thus, litigation of collateral issues in connection with arbitration results
in bifurcated proceedings and tends to defeat the overriding purposes of
arbitration.
Much of the arbitration-related litigation that has occurred in recent
years in securities cases is initiated by brokerage firms that are defendants in disputes with their customers over the handling of the customers'
brokerage accounts. In many of these cases, the reason why the customer brought his or her claim in arbitration rather than in a lawsuit is
that the firm required him or her to sign a printed-form agreement containing an arbitration clause at the time the customer opened the brokerage account. Most of these standard-form agreements limit the possible
arbitration forums to those established and operated by the securities industry. To subject the customer to the expense and delay of litigating
collateral issues, sometimes in trial and appellate courts in more than one
jurisdiction, is inconsistent with both the pro-arbitration policy of the
FAA and the investor-protection policy of the securities laws, as well as
357. See Freel, 14 F.3d at 1312-13; Elahi, 87 F.3d at 594 (the NASD Code was incorporated in an arbitration clause that gave the customer the right to select the arbitration
forum from among the NASD and several other forums). But see Bybyk, 81 F.3d at 1201
(an arbitration agreement that gave the customer the right to select the forum from among
the NASD or one of several stock exchanges did not incorporate the NASD Code "beyond
all reasonable doubt," even though the customer selected the NASD as the forum). The
question raised in Bybyk was whether the agreement incorporated the NASD eligibility
rule. The court held that, whether or not the Code was incorporated into the agreement,
the parties intended to arbitrate the question of arbitrability. Id. at 1201-02.
358. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25 ("The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration .... ).
359. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) ("The preeminent
concern of Congress in passing the [FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which
parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate ....").
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the paramount purpose of arbitration as an alternative to court
proceedings.
There are several ways by which the courts can reduce the amount of
arbitration-related litigation.
One way is to define the term "arbitrability" narrowly. Once a court decides that the subject matter of a
dispute falls within the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate, all
such issues, including the applicability of the NASD eligibility rule, are
presumptively questions for the arbitrators to decide, not questions concerned with arbitrability.
Alternatively, where the parties have manifested in their agreement a
clear and unmistakable intent to submit the question of arbitrability to
the arbitrators, the court should honor that expression of intent, as the
Second Circuit did in the Bybyk case, and not decide the arbitrability
issue itself.
The NASD arbitration rules clearly give the arbitrators the authority to
decide all issues relating to the arbitration and expressly prohibit the parties from litigating these issues while the arbitration is pending. Where
the parties have agreed to arbitrate under these rules, the courts should
implement that agreement by refusing to decide such matters and referring them back to the arbitrators and by awarding attorneys' fees and
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against parties and their attorneys who resort
to unwarranted arbitration-related litigation. In this way, the courts can
further the federal policies of favoring arbitrability of disputes and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate that underlie the FAA.

